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ABSTRACT

You Don’t Have to Go Home, But You Can’t Stay Here:
The Impact of a Camp-Centric International Refugee Regime on Urban Refugees
by
Ainslie Avery
(under the supervision of Prof. Shaden Khallaf)

The American University in Cairo
The insistence of states on confinement to camps, which developed into near-orthodoxy in the
late twentieth century, has emerged alongside increasing refugee urbanization. I argue that the
concept of “refugee” and state policy responses to refugeehood interact in a cyclical and selfperpetuating manner. The concept of refugee comes to act as a master category, or definitional
term that draws clear, immovable borders around a particular discursive space; and in doing so
ignores both people and places which do not adhere to its standards. The international
community maintains a “camp bias” in refugee response policy, while urban refugees fall
through the cracks of the international refugee regime and face significant service and protection
gaps. This thesis poses the question, “What are the impacts of Agier’s conception of the refugee
master category, translated into camp-centric refugee policy, on urban refugees?” I argue that
the international refugee regime bases policy-making on a refugee master category that strives to
embed the characteristics of collectivity, exceptionality, and temporality into popular concepts of
refugeehood, while those refugees who do not conform to these characteristics, namely urban
refugees, are excluded from assistance and face significant structural protection gaps. Based
primarily on extensive literature reviews and case studies of Kenya, Egypt, and Lebanon, this
thesis begins by discussing the urbanization of refugeehood and by defining the refugee master
category in contrast to the realities of this urbanization. This thesis then describes the emergence
of the camp-centric refugee response policy regime, using the development of Kenya’s campconfinement policies as a case study. The challenge posed by urban refugees to the refugee
master category is discussed, followed by an evaluation of the protection gaps facing urban
refugees that result from both a refugee master category and refugee policy regime that turns a
blind eye to the experiences of urban refugees. I conclude that both camp-centric refugee policies
such as camp confinement and persistent protection gaps facing urban refugees effectively
condition refugee behaviour in conformity with the dominant refugee master category, regardless
of its inability to accurately describe contemporary displacement experiences, because the
refugee master categories allow states to justify refugee policies that seek not the best interests of
refugees, but the best interests of states through the externalization, marginalization, and
exclusion of refugees.
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INTRODUCTION

In describing the isolation and marginalization of refugee camps, French anthropologist
Michel Agier observes that,” [n]othing can ever be totally achieved in such contexts, the
incompleteness of the integration process is cosubstantial to [refugees], quarantine being
their very horizon.”1 It is little wonder, then, that a growing number of refugees –
approximately one-third of the world’s refugees, according to UNHCR2 – are fleeing not
once, but twice, or more: first, from persecution and violence, and second, from refugee
camps that deprive them of their livelihoods, their dignity, and their humanity. The
insistence of states on confinement to camps, which developed into near-orthodoxy in the
latter twentieth century, has emerged alongside increasing refugee urbanization. Camp
confinement has become a common practice in the developing world, which hosts the
vast majority of refugees. Thus, policy-makers tend to focus on camps rather than
refugees in urban settings. Developed countries also have a blind spot in addressing the
specific needs and challenges facing urban refugees within their jurisdiction. The campbias may have been a logical policy trend initially, as camps were viewed as one of the
few means to deal with significant numbers of refugees. The persistence of camp-biased
policies in light of growing urbanization among refugees is problematic. Why does this
“camp-bias” persist, in light of trends toward urbanization among refugees, and what are
the impacts of this bias on urban refugees?
I argue that the concept of “refugee” and state policy responses to refugeehood
interact in a cyclical and self-perpetuating manner. The concept of refugee comes to act
as a master category, or definitional term that draws clear, immovable borders around a
particular discursive space; and in doing so ignores both people and places which do not
adhere to its standards. States – with the complicity of international organizations – use
the international refugee regime to advance a particular conceptualization of who is and
who is not a refugee. The international refugee regime thus functions for the benefit of
states, rather than for refugees. Far from being grounded in objective reality, this
conceptualization serves the objectives of dominant states that seek to perpetuate the
1

Michel Agier, On the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2008), 40.
2
UNHCR, “Urban Refugees,” UNHCR, www.unhcr.org/pages/4b0e4cba6.html (accessed October 2012).
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externalization and marginalization of refugees through, among other things, campcentric refugee policies. Camps have become an essential element of refugeehood. As the
international community maintains this “camp bias”, urban refugees fall through the
cracks of the international refugee regime and face significant service and protection
gaps.
This thesis therefore poses the question, “What are the impacts of Agier’s
conception of the refugee master category, translated into camp-centric refugee policy,
on urban refugees?” In Chapter 1, I will describe the conceptual framework through
which the refugee master category will be addressed, while in Chapter 2, the refugee
master category is defined. In Chapter 3, drawing on a case study of Kenya’s camp
confinement policies, I will outline the evolution of the refugee master category and link
its development to the emergency of a camp-centric refugee response regime. In Chapter
4, I argue that urban refugees pose clear challenges to a refugee master category that is
inextricably linked to refugee camps. In Chapter 5, I will demonstrate the impact of a
camp-centric refugee master category and refugee policy regime on urban refugees, using
case studies of urban refugees in Egypt and Lebanon. I argue that the international
refugee regime bases policy-making on a refugee master category that strives to embed
the characteristics of collectivity, exceptionality, and temporality into popular concepts of
refugeehood, while those refugees who do not conform to these characteristics, namely
urban refugees, are excluded from assistance and face significant structural protection
gaps.

Research Problem, Context, and Justification

What is the purpose of investigating the conceptual framework that structures discussion
of refugees? The way refugees are conceptualized intimately impacts how the wider
community – particularly public opinion, non-governmental organizations and
governments – respond to refugees. While this paper focuses primarily on spatial
conceptualizations, discussions of dialectical conceptualizations are closely related. For
example, although “refugee” is a legally defined term, its meaning in the public
consciousness is much more fluid. The socio-cultural concept of “refugee” for those in
2

the developed world is manifold. In the public imagination, the term conjures images of
the weak, vulnerable, poor, weary, gathering in camps set up on the fringes to contain
their misery. But is this the reality for those who seek refuge from persecution? While
their persecution is common, their refuge is not. Contrary to popular imagery or belief,
refugees are not always poor, not always weak, and not always confined to the fringes.
To believe so serves to disenfranchise individual refugees – to assign generalized
characteristics to refugees negates their individual circumstances. The 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) guarantees each individual
seeking refuge the benefit of individual consideration. For example, not every Somali
faces clan-based persecution; not every woman from a Muslim country has a genderbased claim. To believe so eliminates the uniqueness of each individual refugee case.
Most significantly for the purposes of this paper, not all refugees are confined to
refugee camps in peripheral locales. In fact, a growing proportion of refugees flee their
homes – and, indeed, their lives in refugee camps – for urban areas. Karen Jacobsen notes
that, despite government efforts to contain refugees to camps or other designated
settlement areas, such policies are difficult to enforce. This lack of enforcement,
combined with poor living conditions in camps, have led to significant numbers of
refugees moving to urban areas or otherwise self-settling. Refugees seeking shelter in
urban areas may flee directly to cities, or may arrive from camps settings; in some
instances, refugees may have a choice between the two options, while in others a choice
may not be available. Regardless of how or why refugees seek shelter in urban settings,
they often face significant service and protection gaps on arrival.
Once in urban settings, Jacobsen argues that refugees exist at the nexus of two
populations: the urban poor and foreign-born migrants. Urban refugees face numerous
challenges. For example, they may lack access to social networks or have depleted their
resources during their flight, while being more likely to have witnessed or experienced
violence, leading to additional physical and/or mental health issues3. Yet these refugees
are rarely dealt with in national refugee policies, particularly in the developing world,

3

Karen Jacobsen, “Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Urban Areas: A Livelihoods Perspective”, Journal of
Refugee Studies 19 (2006): 276.
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where the majority of refugees reside. Instead, national policies consistently emphasize
refugees in camp settings, and urban refugees are thus often dramatically underserved.
UNHCR estimates that approximately one-third of the world’s 10.5 million
refugees live in urban settings4. Urbanization among refugee populations, like
urbanization among the general population, has increased dramatically in the latter half of
the twentieth century. For the first forty-five years of its existence, UNHCR had no clear
policy on urban refugees, suggesting that no distinction was made between refugees on
the basis of where they sought asylum. During this period, the majority of refugees
seeking asylum originated from Eastern Europe, and it was largely assumed that these
refugees would settle in urban areas. Distinctions between urban and camp refugees did
not emerge until the end of the Cold War, when the changing characteristics of refugees
and evolving strategic interests of states led to the development of the current non-entrée
regime and to efforts to contain refugees to camps.
Despite the efforts of states, directly and indirectly through UNHCR, to contain
refugees in camps, significant numbers continue to seek refuge in urban areas. Unlike
camps, urban areas offer opportunities for employment and financial independence, as
well as freedom from the Foucauldian observation and control of camp officials. Some
refugees believe cities also offer greater access to medical services, educational
opportunities for children, humanitarian aid, or even resettlement. Perhaps most
significantly, given the challenges posed to the dominant myth that refugees want to
return home5, seeking refuge in urban areas represents for many the opportunity to leave
behind the trauma of their flight and build a new life. In many ways, camps seek to
perpetuate the temporality of refugeehood. Agier describes those in camps as, “people
waiting apart from society”6. But a growing number of refugees are no longer content to
wait, despite the efforts of governments to confine them to these “out-places”7.
It is within this context that this paper questions the perpetuation of camp-centric
refugee policies. While numerous previous studies have examined protection and
4

UNHCR, “Urban Refugees.”
B.S. Chimni, “From Resettlement to Voluntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable
Solutions to Refugee Problems,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 23 (2005): 59.
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Agier, On the Margins of Society, 40.
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Michel Agier, Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2011), 17.
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servicing gaps facing urban refugees – often the outcome of camp-centric refugee
policies – few have questioned why such policies persist. It is no longer sufficient to
simply investigate how these policies are failing. It is necessary to interrogate why they
persist if they fail to achieve the purpose states and the international community attribute
to them in the public sphere – refugee protection. It is hoped that by understanding why
such policies persist – particularly vis a vis their relationship with the concept of
“refugee” – it may be possible to de- and re-construct not only the flawed policies
themselves, but the biased conceptualization on which they are built. I argue that, a
flawed refugee concept is at the root of flawed refugee policies, leading to the exclusion
of urban refugees from protection and assistance. To demonstrate this phenomenon, I will
first define the refugee construct or “master category” in order to illustrate how this
“master category” has led to the creation of a camp-centric refugee policy regime. I will
then describe the challenge urban refugees pose to the refugee master category, as well as
service and protection gaps urban refugees continue to face despite longstanding trends of
urban refuge.

Research Questions
This thesis seeks to address the primary question, “What are the impacts of Agier’s
conception of the refugee master category, translated into camp-centric refugee policy,
on urban refugees?” In order to answer this primary question, a number of secondary
questions will also be addressed:


What or who does the refugee master category include, and what or who does the
refugee master category exclude? Is there a justification for inclusion or
exclusion, or are they political strategies?



What policies have governments and policy-makers used to cultivate and sustain
the camp-centric conceptualization of refugees? How have these policies evolved,
how have they been justified, whose interests do they serve, and who benefits
from their application? Who challenges this conceptualization, and how?



What are the effects of camp-centric policies on refugees in urban settings? Do
those in urban settings face greater protection gaps or vulnerabilities?
5

I argue that the refugee master category privileges camp-based refugees, while
excluding urban refugees, because a camp-centric concept of refugeehood allows states to
justify policies that externalize, marginalize and exclude refugees. The camp-centric
refugee concept is maintained by camp-based policies such as camp confinement, which
have become predominant since the end of the Cold War. Urban refugees challenge the
camp-centric refugee concept, but in doing so, are subject to service and protection gaps
that, by disadvantaging urban refugees, work to condition their behaviour to conform
with the camp-centric refugee concept.

Objectives
The primary objective of this investigation is to interrogate how the “refugee” master
category structures and disciplines refugee policy, and to determine the impact of a
“camp-bias” in both the refugee master category and refugee policy on refugees outside
of camp settings. By conceptualizing of refugees in a particular way, certain types of
refugees – such as urban refugees – are excluded; response policies based on such
concepts neglect those who do not conform, leaving them under-protected and underserved. This thesis seeks to highlight both the power relations inherent in developing and
maintaining the refugee master category, and to illustrate the role of the refugee master
category in structuring refugee policies. To achieve this, the thesis contrasts “campbiased” or camp-centric policies, such as those present in Kenya, with the growing trend
toward urbanization among refugees. Trends toward urbanization in light of camp-centric
policies are then problematized by highlighting protection gaps facing urban refugees, as
illustrated by the cases of urban refugees in Cairo and Beirut.

Key Terms and Definitions

Throughout this thesis, several key terms will be used in describing characteristics of
both the refugee “master category” – discussed further in Chapter 1 – and the
international refugee policy regime, as well as their impacts on urban refugees. These
terms are defined and described below.
6

Refugee and Refugeehood
Although at particular points throughout this thesis, the legal definition of “refugee” as
outlined in the Refugee Convention and Protocol are discussed, the term “refugee” is
interpreted herein to describe the popular concept of who is and who is not a refugee. The
popular concept of “refugee” is closely related to the refugee master category and is
defined in greater detail in Chapters 1 and 2. The popular concept of “refugee”, rather
than the legal definition of “refugee”, is used because this thesis describes how refugees
are viewed in terms of their location in the social context of both states and the
international community. This location is inextricably linked to how refugees are viewed
by governments, policies, and the general public, and has a significant impact on the
development of refugee policies at both the national and international level.
Closely related, the term “refugeehood” is used to describe the state of being a
refugee. Like the term “refugee”, “refugeehood” is used in relation to the popular
construction of what it means to be a refugee. “Refugeehood” is the condition upon
which the socially- and politically-defined characteristics of being a refugee are
projected; one enters into “refugeehood” after first being displaced and becoming a
“refugee”. “Refugehood” is therefore related to one’s experiences once they have already
been displaced, rather than to the conditions that caused their displacement, and describes
their characteristics during the post-displacement period.

Camp-Centric/Camp-Biased Policies
The “camp-centricity” or “camp-bias” of the international refugee policy regime
describes the reliance of states, the international community, and international
organizations on refugee camps as the primary response mechanism to refugee-producing
situations. Though this reliance was originally grounded in operational expediency,
ongoing urbanization among refugees highlights both the divide between the conceptual
foundations of refugee policy and contemporary displacement experiences.
This camp-bias is evident at the national and international level. At the national
level, the camp-bias is manifested in policies such as camp confinement and restrictions
on assistance to and protection of refugees in urban areas. Through these policies,
7

governments, the international community, and international organizations such as
UNHCR establish refugee camps as the primary response mechanism for refugees. In
addition, camp-centric policies divert response resources away from urban refugees,
despite their numerical significance and equal need for assistance and protection. At the
international level, the camp-bias appears in both the preference of international response
agencies and states for camp-centric responses and in the unequal distribution of
resources between camp-based and urban operations. Inequitable distribution of response
resources lead to significant, long-term protection gaps for urban refugees, even in states
where seeking refuge in camps is not an option.

Protection Gaps
The term “protection gaps” is used to describe areas in which refugees generally, and
urban refugees in particular, are lacking in the services or assistance necessary to
actualize their rights and entitlements under both international human rights law and
international refugee law. Protection gaps refer not only to shortfalls in legal and physical
protection, but also to obstacles that prevent refugees from achieving a sustainable
livelihood and accessing social services that are unaddressed by states. In Chapter 5,
protection gaps are further broken down into legal gaps, economic gaps, and social
service gaps.

Methodology

Research for this paper will be conducted primarily through literature review and
secondary research. Although literature review dealing directly with the conceptual
foundations of refugee policy is lacking, numerous authors have dealt with related topics
that contribute to the subject herein. Case studies will be incorporated to illustrate aspects
of the argument. First, in Chapter 3, in describing the development and maintenance of
camp-centric policies, the case of Kenya will be used to illustrate the national and
international contexts within which camp confinement policies, in particular, emerged.
This case study will help illustrate the role of camps in maintaining particular aspects of
dominant refugee concepts – namely, temporality, exceptionality, and marginality – as
8

well as suggest who is the primary beneficiary of the international refugee regime.
Second, in Chapter 5, following a discussion of how urban refugees challenge dominant
refugee constructs, case studies of Egypt and Lebanon will be used to describe the
protection gaps that result from an emphasis on camp refugees as “true” refugees. The
purpose of these case studies is to highlight different aspects of a larger phenomenon: that
the persistence of a camp-centric refugee concept ignores and disadvantages urban
refugees. The Kenyan case study highlights the significance of camps, and camp-centric
refugee policies, in the international refugee regime and in developing national and
global refugee policy. The Egyptian and Lebanese case studies illustrate the outcome of
such global policy trends for urban refugees – isolation, socio-economic exclusion, and
impoverishment. Recognizing that these case studies are not directly comparable – nor
are they intended to be so – each case study illustrates a portion of the paper’s overall
argument.

Limitations and Ethical Issues

The majority of research conducted for this work will be secondary research, drawing on
existing literature and case studies. While authors in various disciplines have approached
topics related to conceptualizing refugees, few have dealt specifically with the topic at
hand. As a result, there is a limited amount of pre-existing research at the conceptual
level to draw upon. While this paper aims to fill this gap, the dearth of literature to date
has proven challenging in developing research foundations and the conceptual
framework. Despite these challenges, this research design is intentional, as the paper is
concerned with macro-level, conceptual analysis, rather than micro-level analysis of
individual experiences. This method also limits ethical concerns that would otherwise
impact researchers in direct contact with individual refugees. Literature gaps on this topic
are themselves revealing, and I hope to address these gaps by offering new insight into
challenges facing urban refugees at a conceptual level.
In researching this chapter, I had hoped to interview staff of non-governmental
organizations in each city; in Cairo, staff at AMERA, Caritas, St. Andrew’s Refugee
Services, Catholic Refugee Services, the Psycho-Social Training Institute of Cairo, and
9

Refuge Egypt, and in Beirut, staff at the Lebanese High Relief Commission, Caritas,
AMEL Association, RESTART, Danish Refugee Council, Makhzoumi Foundation,
Association Justice et Misericode. Interviewees were to be offered the option to conduct
interviews via email or Skype, or, in Cairo, in person. Interviews were intended to discuss
NGO relationships with UNHCR Regional Offices in Cairo and Beirut and with
government officials, challenges in working with and facing urban refugees, and
significant protection gaps impacting urban refugees. Unfortunately, the majority of
organizations approached for research assistance were unresponsive, and as such I was
unable to conduct the desired primary research. However, I was able to draw on personal
experience obtained while working with urban refugees in Cairo during an internship
from August 2012 to May 2013. Given this experience, as well as the significant number
of studies conducted on urban refugees, particularly in Cairo, I feel that, despite the
absence of primary sources, protection gaps facing urban refugees as well-described.

Summary

This study questions why “camp-biased” refugee policies persist in the face of growing
urbanization among refugees. It is argued that camp-biased policies serve to reinforce the
dominant refugee concept or master category. It is states, rather than refugees, who
benefit from this conceptualization. By challenging the refugee master category, urban
refugees effectively challenge fundamental pillars of the international refugee regime.
This challenge is met with neglect of their unique protection needs, ongoing
marginalization, and enduring impoverishment.
The case of urban refugees is by no means the only example of the effect of a
reality that differs from a strategically valuable socio-political construct. However, this
author contends that undertaking this study not only highlights the divide between
concepts and reality, but that it offers a concrete starting point from which to bring the
two more closely in line. The case of urban refugees also contributes to broader policymaking discourse, exposing flaws in the refugee construct upon which policies are based.
By questioning these concepts, and policies based on them, it may be possible to adjust
10

refugee policies and responses to displacement in order to offer better protection and
assistance to urban refugees. This paper therefore aims to critique the very root of refugee
policy and add to policy discourse an understanding of how the conceptual basis of
refugee policy dramatically impacts the provision of protection and response to urban
refugees.

11

Chapter 1: URBANIZATION OF REFUGEEHOOD
Urbanization is not a trend confined solely to refugees. Over half of the world’s
population currently resides in urban areas, and it has been estimated that, by 2030,
approximately five billion people will live in urban settings8. Throughout this period,
approximately ninety-five percent of urban growth will likely occur in the developing
world9. Nor is urbanization a new trend among displaced persons. In earlier decades
government leaders and international organizations largely assumed that refugees would
settle in urban areas – and a large portion did. This assumption persisted until the mid- to
late 1980s, when refugee camps emerged as the preferred choice for responding to
refugee situations, particularly in Africa and Asia. Camps have come to dominate the
international refugee regime to the extent that some scholars have characterized them as a
fourth durable solution, despite their purportedly temporary nature. Camp-based response
policies are now so fundamental to the refugee management that many question whether
UNHCR should provide long-term assistance to urban refugees, despite the fact that
neither the Refugee Convention and Protocol nor UNHCR’s mandate distinguish between
the rights and services to which refugees residing in different areas are entitled10. The
reversal of attitudes to camp-based refugee management, including characterising
refugees as potential criminal or politically de-stabilizing influences is examined in a case
study of Kenya in Chapter 3.
Despite increasingly camp-centric response policies, refugees have continued to
settle in urban areas. Their ongoing desire to do so challenges and subverts a notion of
refugeehood that is inextricably linked to camps. Currently, UNHCR estimates that
approximately one-third of all refugees live in urban areas, a portion that has remained
relatively stable over the past five years11. In contrast, approximately twelve percent of

8

Dale Bruscher, Karen Jacobsen, and Andrea Lari, “Addressing Urban Displacement: Specific Needs and
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refugees live in camps, while the remainder are unaccounted for12. The statistics
describing urban refugees are likely to be underestimated as one of the primary reasons
many seek refuge in urban areas is anonymity and a desire to minimize contact with
authorities13. Since the early 2000s, the proportion of UNHCR’s persons of concern
living in urban areas has increased dramatically. In 1996, approximately one percent of
persons of concern lived in urban areas; by 2005, this proportion increased to eighteen
percent, and by 2007 to twenty-seven percent14. This suggests that, despite the assistance
available in refugee camps as they have developed through the 1980s and early 1990s,
large numbers of refugees believe that urban settings offer better livelihood and
protection opportunities.
At present policies that prioritize camp-based responses have a significant and
overall negative impact on the ability of urban refugees to access services and protection.
“Instead of considering mobility as an asset to enhance self-reliance, [camp-centric
policies] focus on enhancing self-reliance to prevent mobility.”15 UNHCR’s urban
refugee policy shift from “care and maintenance” to “self-reliance” results in fewer
available services. Fewer officially sanctioned urban-based services from UNHCR are
compounded by the structural barriers imposed by many host states, which prevent
refugees in urban areas from developing sustainable livelihoods. Taken together, urban
refugees face significant challenges in securing protection and accessing services. These
challenges are discussed further in Chapter 5, drawing on case studies of Egypt and
Lebanon.
Refugees chose to flee to urban areas for a variety of reasons. In some cases, a
state may host no established refugee camps within its borders, forcing refugees to settle
wherever they can. Once somewhat settled, one can imagine the lack of interest in
moving to a camp if and when such a location is established. Living conditions in camps
also factor in the choices refugees make. Word of mouth descriptions of dismal sanitation
and lack of shelter are impetuses to avoid more desperation. A similar result occurs once
refugees have spent some time in a refugee camp – life outside the camp, despite its
12
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dangers and restrictions, still seems a better alternative for many. Generally, scholars
describe the motivations of refugees in seeking refuge in urban areas in terms of access to
resources and services that are not available in either camp settings or rural areas. These
resources can be broadly categorized as resources to increase power and anonymity or as
resources to improve livelihoods.
Many scholars suggest that one of the primary motivations behind settlement in
urban areas is a desire to maintain power within and control over their living situation.
Whereas camp settings strictly proscribe the activities and livelihood strategies available
to refugees – partially by eliminating their individual agency and reconstituting them as
passive recipients of aid – urban settlement offers greater opportunities for independence
and choice among livelihood strategies. Urban settlement can thus be interpreted as a
means of emphasizing individual refugee agency. Further, urban settlement may be
viewed as an assertion of control over identity formation vis a vis the “refugee” label. As
Roger Zetter suggests, despite the significant role of powerful institutions and actors in
the labelling process, those subject to labelling are not without influence in defining the
labels they are assigned16. By asserting independence in contrast to the passivity implied
by the refugee label, urban refugees subvert contemporary understandings of who or what
a refugee is. The challenge urban refugees pose to the refugee concept are discussed
further in Chapter 4.
One of the most well-described factors behind urban settlement is a desire among
refugees to remain anonymous17. Given that many refugees’ personal histories and
displacement experiences include interactions with authorities ranging from malicious
neglect to persecution, a desire for anonymity is not surprising. Harrell-Bond and Voutira
suggest that, when residing in camps, refugees are subsumed under bureaucratic
structures that embed the control of camp administrators over them18, while Agier
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describes the evolution of camps into a form of humanitarian government that integrates
control into humanitarian assistance19. In this context, refugees may and often do
perceive attempts by camp administrators to control virtually every aspect of their lives –
through the distribution of aid, management of movement, registration and research – as
a threat to their independence. Seeking the anonymity of an urban area offers an
alternative to such Foucauldian control. Polzer and Hammond characterise attempts at
anonymity as a manifestation of James Scott’s “weapons of the weak” – a vulnerable
population using the limited resources available to avoid Foucauldian “powers that be”20.
Polzer and Hammond go on to suggest that anonymity, or invisibility, functions as a
survival resource for urban refugees. Efforts to attain anonymity often include
minimizing contact with bureaucratic authorities, including health or social service
providers. Unfortunately, this exacerbates their vulnerability to discrimination and
harassment, and importantly inhibits efforts to accurately estimate their numbers,
understand their particular vulnerabilities, and develop policies that address their needs.
Where a choice is available, refugees frequently choose urban settlement because
urban settings offer greater access to livelihood and survival resources. Alexander Betts
argues that the need to secure resources necessary for survival is as important to many
refugees as flight from persecution21; similarly, once an individual or family chooses to
flee, the choice of destination is partially determined by where survival resources can be
obtained. These survival resources include employment, housing, education for children,
and possible material assistance from humanitarian or social service organizations. By
moving to urban areas, refugees may be able to access social networks or migrant
enclaves22. In addition, refugees may believe that they can only seek international
protection by approaching UN agencies in urban centres. The “pull factor” thesis has
been advanced to describe how asylum-seeking behaviours are influenced by the
availability of international aid programs, such as resettlement programs23. Paradoxically,
many of the resources refugees seek by settling in urban areas are in reality either
19
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unavailable or difficult to access. This is due, in part, to camp-biased refugee policies that
dedicate resources to camps at the expense of urban refugees. The protection and service
gaps that result are discussed further in Chapter 5.
Finally, when faced with the prospect of settling in either a rural or urban area,
refugees may choose to settle in a location similar to their home region for reasons
relating to familiarity. For instance, refugees originating from an urban setting would
naturally chose to settle in another urban area because their skills and experience are
better suited to urban life. Familiarity with the circumstances in the location of refuge are
balanced with the opportunities available for securing a sustainable livelihood. On the
other hand, a refugee from a rural area may believe that settling in an urban area provides
access to opportunities for education or training that can help them to develop a more
diverse set of skills and thus maximize their potential for securing a higher standard of
living in the future. The factors leading refugees to opt for urban settlement are diverse
and vary between individuals, yet are highly persuasive for many when weighing asylum
options.

1.1 Conceptual Framework
I contend that, in popular discourse, the concept of “refugee” acts as a type of master
category. The concept of master categories was first discussed by C.W. Mills in the 1959
manuscript, The Sociological Imagination. Mills suggested that it was impossible to
investigate a particular subject or phenomenon – in his case, from a sociological
perspective – without first establishing precisely who or what is included for study. As
understood by Mills, master categories serve to structure discursive space, drawing
borders around particular subjects in order to undertake meaningful analysis. Master
categories operate much like labels, in that they define an inside/outside dichotomy that
then serves as the basis of investigation – that is, master categories allow for the
definition of a subject of analysis, while simultaneously defining the boundaries of the
subject. Mills argued that establishing master categories was an imperative first step to
undertaking research and to unpacking sociological phenomenon, to creating order out of
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chaos by structuring the world of social interaction. Through master categories, complex
issues can be illuminated and simplified.
However, it is this simplification that is also cause for concern, and as Saskia
Sassen asserts, master categories can effectively obscure as much as they explain. For
example, Sassen illustrates how construction of “the global” as a master category, with
“its own power logics and exclusions”24, overlooks the role of national and subnational
components that continue to structure globalizing processes. Sassen argues that it is
therefore essential to “unsettle” such master categories on the understanding that they are
not discreet, standalone beings. Instead, master categories are necessarily a product of
social and political relations, and are produced by a power struggle for control over
knowledge production. To understand a master category, and its effect on its subject, it is
necessary to evaluate the dynamics within which it developed and operates.
I argue that “refugee” acts as a master category that structures both public
discourse and government policy. Adopting Sassen’s critique, this thesis will investigate,
first, the outward manifestation of the refugee master category and how this has
structured government policy responses – particularly through camp confinement
policies. As governments, through public policy toward refugees internally and through
action toward refugees externally, embed a “camp bias” into the refugee concept that is
they reify their physical externalization25. Once the confinement of refugees to camps in
marginal areas – typically in the developing world – is accepted as a defining
characteristic of refugeehood, the manipulation of the international refugee regime to
achieve this end, as illustrated by Chimni26, becomes palatable to the public
consciousness. In other words, the refugee master category is as much a child of politics
and socially constructed power relations, as it is of its humanitarian concern.
Second, this thesis will explore the effect of the refugee master category on a
specific subset of refugees who are excluded from both public and government
conceptions of refugeehood: urban refugees. Reliance on “refugee” as a master category
comes with a price – particularly for those falling outside of it. For example, it has been
24
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argued that, in the legal sense, achievement of refugee status places one in a privileged
category. This does not account for the hierarchies within the category of refugees27. The
dissolution of “refugee” as a discreet category in public discourse through its conflation
with mixed migration and its application to displacement not captured by the Refugee
Convention and Protocol may further erode the status granted by legal recognition. The
term “refugee” becomes at once heavy with connotation, yet devoid of meaning.
In investigating the exclusion of urban refugees from public and policy
conceptions of refugeehood, this thesis will discuss why the exclusion still exists. Urban
refugees pose a significant challenge to the refugee master category, in that they call into
question characteristics that are considered fundamental to refugeehood, such as
temporality and separateness. The increasingly protracted nature of displacement further
problematizes these characteristics. Protracted displacement renders characteristics of the
refugee master category, particularly temporality and exceptionality, inapplicable to both
urban and camp-based refugees, despite the efforts of states and the international refugee
regime to advance these characteristics as fundamental to refugeehood. If these
characteristics, accepted by many policy-makers as virtual truisms, are inaccurate,
refugee policies structured on them are in danger of being ineffective. It is already
evident that the outcome of sustaining a “camp biased” refugee policy is to leave the
significant protection gaps facing urban refugees unaddressed. By examining in depth a
particular aspect of the refugee concept, I hope to “unsettle” this master category and
problematize public discourse and government policy – or, alternatively, sporadic,
unguided government responses – founded upon it.

1.2 Literature Review

As the primary research methodology is based on the review of existing case studies and
relevant literature, a proposed bibliography outlining relevant source materials is
attached. However, there is little written, to date, about how conceptualizing “refugees”
in a particular way can exclude and disadvantage specific refugee populations. This may
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be due, in part, to an understanding among academics that, as experts, their
conceptualization of refugees is far broader than that adopted by the general public,
policy-makers, or government leaders. However, given that the general public, policymakers, and government leaders each play a role in actualizing protections, services, and
rights for refugees, it is important to consider the effect of a popular refugee concept that
neglects certain populations or subgroups – such as urban refugees. Given this lack of
concentrated literature, it is necessary to consolidate a variety of key works from various
disciplines in order to describe the function, purpose, and outcome of conceptualizing
refugees in a particular manner.
Building on Saskia Sassen’s critique of master categories, Tara Polzer, Laura
Hammond, and Roger Zetter describe processes by which governments and international
institutions manage the refugee master category. Zetter, in discussing the process of
labelling refugees, effectively charts the application and function of the refugee master
category to the international institutional refugee regime. Labels, Zetter notes, “are the
tangible representation of policies and programmes, in which labels are not only formed
but are then also transformed by bureaucratic processes which institutionalize and
differentiate categories of eligibility and entitlements… labels develop their own
rationale and legitimacy and become a convenient and accepted shorthand”28 – seeking,
much like master categories, to simplify and explain their subjects to permit an
institutional response. Zetter goes on to argue that, as changing migration patterns and
shifting causality make it increasingly difficult to maintain the “convenient images” of
refugees upon which institutional responses are based, the effectiveness of the refugee
label is fracturing. Like B.S. Chimni, Zetter argues that dominant states are not only the
key actors in (re)defining the refugee label, these states use the redefinition process to
serve their interests. If, as Zetter notes, refugee status remains “the only systematic and
relatively accessible route for large-scale, globalized migration,”29 these states have a
vested interest in closely managing the distribution of the refugee label. The result is that,
“the concept of labelling reveals how seemingly essential bureaucratic practices to
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manage the influx of refugees, and thus manage an image, in fact produces highly
discriminatory labels designed to mediate the interests of the state.”30
By encouraging fracturing of the refugee label, governments effectively create
categories of less preferential refugee protection. For example, refugees in urban settings
are more closely associated with economic migrants, and it is often assumed that the
ability to make the journey to an urban area implies that urban refugees can take care of
themselves, rendering them less deserving of protection31. At the same time, through a
“draconian mix of deterrent measures and in-country policies and regulations”32 – such as
camp confinement policies – states seek to manage claims to refugee status, thus
shrinking the available protection space. However, Zetter argues that the transformation
or fracturing of labels is not a one-way process, and that refugees are not always
“dependent victims of larger institutional powers outside their control.”33 Rather,
refugees have a degree of agency in choosing to adopt or oppose the characteristics
imposed by labels. For example, by claiming status in opposition to the restrictions
defined by states, urban refugees subvert the institutional labels imposed on them –
making them a significant threat to both the state’s ability to manage the refugee master
category, and to the legitimacy of its attempts to do so.
In a similar vein, Polzer and Hammond argue that, “by seeing, describing and
categorizing social reality, we also make people and processes invisible.”34 Applying
concepts of visibility and invisibility to “self-settled” refugees, Polzer and Hammond
discuss how both governments and UNHCR seek to manage the visibility of refugee
subsets to serve institutional interests. For example, by managing the (in)visibility of its
subjects, governments and agencies can restrict the scope of their obligations to provide
protection or assistance35. Further, Polzer and Hammond note that academia, by seeking
“policy-relevance”36 in analysis and by adhering to institutionally defined categories, can
be complicit in reproducing invisibility; for instance, “self-settled” refugees in the global
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south are less studied than their counterparts in camps, while urban refugees were
“almost entirely invisible to both practitioners and academics”37 until around 2001.
Invisibility, they contend, is the outcome of relationships between those with
power and those without: “invisibility is therefore fundamentally relational; its impacts
depend on the power relations and interests connecting those who see and those who are
to be seen (or not).”38 Keeping people and processes invisible requires power, but
institutions that have such power can impose visibility or invisibility – through the
application of categories and labels – against the will of their subjects. Like Zetter, Polzer
and Hammond suggest that the subjects of labelling and categorization play a role in
determining their own (in)visibility – albeit in a different way. While Zetter emphasizes
the ability of the subjects of labelling to challenge both the labels themselves and the
legitimacy of those imposing labels, Polzer and Hammond suggest that invisibility can be
used to the advantage of the invisible – that, in fact, refugees may chose to remain
invisible in order to avoid regulation or intervention by authorities. Drawing on James
Scott’s “weapons of the weak”, which describes ways that disempowered citizens work
to remain invisible to Foucauldian “powers that be”39, the authors draw parallels to
survival strategies adopted by urban refugees that reinforce their invisibility. For
example, by avoiding contact with institutions and authorities, or obscuring or adopting
new identities, urban refugees may seek greater freedom to pursue livelihoods, while
simultaneously reifying their invisibility. Therefore, “neither visibility nor invisibility are
inherently routes to empowerment – the impact depends on the relationship between
actors and the functions which visibility plays.”40
Anita Fabos and Gaim Kibreab illustrate the translation of the labelling and
categorization of refugees into government policy, both as an outcome of and a
mechanism for maintaining public conceptions. Fabos and Kibreab view state policies of
segregation, securitization, and criminalization – manifested, for example, in restrictions
on freedom of movement – as being linked to a specific political objective of creating and
perpetuating differences between insiders (citizens) and outsiders (refugees). In order to
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prevent integration and prolong refugee status, which reinforces popular concepts of
refugeehood, spatial segregation becomes a common tool. However, by removing spatial
segregation, urban refugees challenge, among other characteristics, the division between
insiders and outsiders, and the temporary basis of refugeehood –undermining popular
concepts of “refugee” and the policies built upon them.
How do these concepts translate into refugee policies? B.S. Chimni tracks the
evolution of the refugee regime, arguing that dominant Western states manipulate the
refugee regime and refugee discourse to achieve political objectives – particularly spatial
segregation, or “containment”41, of refugees and the maintenance of a “myth of
difference”42. Chimni’s work locates refugee studies and the refugee regime within
shifting twentieth century geopolitics, arguing that Western states’ policy toward
refugees has moved from neglect to manipulation to containment43. Though the legal
framework through which refugees are recognized and protected has not changed, the
interpretation of the Refugee Convention and Protocol and operational policies have
shifted toward advocacy of assistance and protection in regions of origin. By adopting
this approach, Western governments are not necessarily seeking the best method for
addressing refugee protection, but rather the best method of containing refugees to the
developing world, far from their borders. Such practices reflect the self-interest that
underlies not only the international refugee regime, but the international state system on a
whole.
In order to justify this spatial segregation, Western states have adopted and
perpetuate a “myth of difference”. Chimni articulates this myth – a new way of
conceptualizing refugees – as establishing “the nature and character of refugee flows in
the Third World… as being radically different from refugee flows in Europe since the
end of the First World War.”44 From this “myth of difference” came explanations that
refugee flows resulted from internal conflict in post-colonial states a view of
circumstances which simultaneously rejects external causality (i.e. invasion by a hostile
government) and the resulting exilic basis of refugeehood (i.e. being forced to move to
41

Chimni, “Geopolitics of Refugee Studies,” 350.
Ibid., 351.
43
See also Laura Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,”
International Journal of Refugee Law 14 (2002): 238-262.
44
Ibid., 351.
42

22

avoid invading forces). If the West is not culpable for refugee situations, and protection
can be provided in regions of origin, the West has no moral obligation to accommodate
refugees in their territory. Chimni argues that such justifications have been increasingly
invoked to permit the institutionalization of a non-entrée regime which seeks to contain
refugees in the “empty” spaces of the developing world45. Further, Chimni finds UNHCR
equally culpable in the production and dissemination of knowledge to reinforce the policy
orientation of developed states.
To illustrate both the turn toward non-entrée and containment-focused policies, as
well as UNHCR’s role in legitimating this shift, Chimni discusses trends in durable
solutions. Of the three durable solutions available to refugees – repatriation, resettlement,
and local integration – Chimni suggests that Western preferences have shifted in tandem
with changing characteristics of refugee flows. Specifically, during the Cold War era,
refugees, who originated primarily from behind the Iron Curtain, were perceived to be
less of a socio-cultural intrusion, and to have significant geopolitical value. As such,
resettlement to the West was pursued in the majority of cases. However, following the
end of the Cold War, as more refugees arrived in the West from the global south, Western
states increasingly pursued repatriation as the preferred solution. This shift was aided by
UNHCR, which declared the 1990s to be the “decade of repatriation”46. The “myth of
difference”, or the conceptualization of “refugee” in the public consciousness, plays a key
role in legitimating such a policy shift. Chimni thus illustrates how dominant states both
construct and perpetuate a particular image or master category on which to base and
justify self-interested and politically motivated refugee policies.
Michel Agier expands further on the role of spatial segregation, in the form of
refugee camps, in reinforcing particular aspects of refugeehood. Agier’s works on the
role of camps in the development of humanitarian government, the transformation of
camp spaces and the adaptation of refugees to camp settings provide relevant insights
into camps as “spaces of exception”. In describing refugee camps and camp confinement
policies, he illustrates how camps have come to define the refugee experience, and feed
into a self-perpetuating cycle of both physical and conceptual separation from the
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developed world. Agier makes several observations about the exceptionality of refugee
camps. First, he highlights the role of camps in establishing and maintaining the physical
separation of refugees from both their country of origin and from the local population.
Drawing on Foucault, who argued that refugees were the first people to be “imprisoned
outside”47, Agier argues that refugee camps – as well as the reception/detention centres
that sprang up across Europe during the 2000s – represent an extension of strategies that
seek to distance “the undesirables”48. Once in camps, refugees are further distinguished
from other populations because they become the subjects of a parallel set of international
guarantees of rights – despite their limited abilities to actualize these rights. In camps,
rights and freedoms become resources whose distribution depends on the favour of those
with administrative and operational authority. Camps thus become “zones of exceptional
rights and power, where everything seems possible for those in control”49. Tellingly,
Agier notes that the necessity of this separation is reified through the distribution of
international aid: in both Kenya and Uganda – whose camp confinement policies are to
be investigated in depth – aid to refugees is conditional, depending on their segregation in
camps.
Agier’s observations on the separateness of camps is closely related to his
description of the relegation of camp refugees to both the spatial and conceptual margins.
Refugee camps, to Agier, represent a consolidation of the division between a “clean,
healthy and visible world” (us) and “the world’s residual ‘remnants’, dark, diseased and
invisible” (them)50. Their location in border spaces, at the physical margins of a state,
distanced from the theoretically civilized core, is simply the spatial manifestation of the
conceptual division. Their location is the product of both operational expediency – in that
many camps are located in remote areas near borders where refugees cross – and
deliberate political strategy. By locating camps on the margins, their status is clearly
delineated from a host state’s society, creating physical and conceptual barriers to
integration and preserving their exceptionality.
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Finally, Agier’s observations on the role of camps in giving the illusion of a
suspended state of emergency, despite their often protracted nature, completes the
conceptual image of “refugee”. The association of refugeehood with states of emergency
seeks to reinforce its temporary nature – an association which makes the confinement of
significant numbers of people in marginal, extra-territorial space less morally
reprehensible. As Agier suggests,
[i]t is only the emergency situation and its exception character that
justify these spaces, but at the same time these factors tend to
reproduce themselves, to spread and establish themselves over the long
term. This permanent precariousness is the first fact that strikes you
when you arrive in a camp.51
Further, the temporality of camps impacts perceptions of the ideal durable solution to
refugee situations: “humanitarian sites are supposed to be precarious spaces, always
provisional. The principle implies that the official end of a war is followed by departure
of refugees…”52, presumably to their country of origin, rather than to either a
neighbouring area or a distant third country. However, Agier goes on to suggest that
camps, despite their supposed temporality, take on “a certain duration”53 and in many
ways come to resemble cities in themselves.
Agier’s observations lead to the ultimate conclusion that, above all, the primary
function of refugee camps is control – as he writes, “there is no care without control”54.
By controlling the physical separation and movement of refugees, it is possible to control
public perceptions of refugeehood in a way that permits ongoing marginalization and
externalization. Similarly, in illustrating the role of refugee camps in both informing
definitions of “refugee”, Agier shows how camps support the self-perpetuating cycle of
spatial and conceptual externalization of refugees. By nurturing a concept of “refugee” in
the public consciousness that is defined by the camp experience, a camp-based response
to refugee situations is constructed as the primary solution, which then further reinforces
the place of refugees on the margins. Agier’s conclusions serve to reveal the strategy of
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marginalization and externalization pursued by Western states in promoting and
maintaining the existing concept of “refugee”.
What is the outcome of incorporating such “camp-biased” concepts into refugee
policy? While specific outcomes for refugees vary by location – as will be shown by
reviewing protection gaps and servicing challenges facing urban refugees in Cairo and
Beirut – Karen Jacobsen advocates the use of a livelihoods framework to approach urban
refugee situations. In doing so, she illustrates the outcome of a camp bias in refugee
policy and servicing. A livelihood framework considers both assets and strategies that are
used to achieve a desired outcome, and the structural or institutional context that can
constrain access to these assets and strategies55. Three components make up the
livelihood framework: vulnerability context; assets and strategies; and outcomes56. In
applying this framework to urban refugees, Jacobsen finds that, “[c]ompared with their
co-nationals in camps, urban refugees often face greater protection risks, and receive less
support in terms of shelter, health care, education, and other social services – and
sometimes none at all.”57 Specific – and common – gaps Jacobsen identifies include the
inability to secure housing; lack of identification and documentation; xenophobia and
competition with locals for scarce resources; and access to credit and financial services58.

1.3 Conclusion

This chapter describes the framework through which the concept of refugeehood is to be
addressed. This chapter reviewed literature surrounding the construction of refugeehood,
how understandings of refugeehood and policies toward refugees have evolved since the
end of the Cold War, and the emergence of a camp-based refugee policy regime. The
camp-based policy regime has come to inform how refugeehood is understood by
governments, policy-makers, and the public, despite its exclusion of urban refugees from
popular concepts of refugeehood. I argue that many of the challenges facing urban
refugees are causally linked to a refugee master category that favours camp-based refugee
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response policies and camp-settled refugees over urban refugees. The following chapters
will illustrate how the conceptual exclusion of urban refugees leads to neglect of their
needs for protection and assistance.
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Chapter 2: “REFUGEE” AS “MASTER CATEGORY”

This chapter describes the primary characteristics of refugees and key assumptions about
refugeehood that shape the refugee “master category”. It is important to discuss the
foundational assumptions of the refugee master category, in order to contrast these
assumptions – and policies based on these assumptions – with the evolving realities of
contemporary displacement. These assumptions relate to the belief that refugeehood is a
collective condition, an exceptional state of being, and temporary. While these are not the
sole characteristics of refugeehood, they play an important role in shaping how
refugeehood is conceptualized in the public sphere and among policy-makers. The
essential challenge with these assumptions is that they exclude a significant number of
refugees who cannot conform to this image of the “ideal” refugee. When these
assumptions become the foundation of refugee policy, despite their inaccuracies, the
refugee master category loses its definitional functionality and becomes an exclusionary
construct which deepens existing vulnerabilities among excluded populations.
As discussed, the contemporary refugee construct or master category shifted
dramatically following the Cold War. When the binary international balance of power
collapsed, dominant states saw less urgency in intervening in potentially refugee
producing conflicts. Simultaneously refugees lost their significance as political tools who
could be used to illustrate the flaws in opposing political and socio-economic ideologies.
B.S. Chimni describes the resulting phenomenon as “new refugees,” constructed against a
backdrop of a “myth of difference”59. These “new refugees” came to dominate refugee
discourse in the public sphere, and to influence what policy-makers saw as appropriate
responses to refugee situations, leading them to turn toward camp-based refugee response
policies. This new trend differed dramatically from prior trends in refugee response
policies, which favoured resettlement in dominant states based on assumptions that, if
Cold War refugees returned to their countries of origin, they would face imprisonment or
death. Seeking refuge during the Cold War was considered a fundamentally political act,
with significantly negative impacts of the relationship between individuals and their
states.
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Since the end of the Cold War, seeking refuge has been effectively removed from
its political context and is increasingly considered a mechanism of socio-economic and
physical survival – without necessarily impacting the relationship between citizens and
states over the long term. Because the bond between states and citizens, in theory,
remains intact, it is assumed that refugees want to return to their country of origin as soon
as possible, further embedding the exceptionality and temporality of asylum into popular
concepts of refugeehood. These assumptions are used to justify new trends in refugee
response and management policies that externalize refugees from dominant, Western
states, marginalize refugees within host states in the developing world, and exclude
refugees from integrating into host societies60. These policies have evolved into a campbased refugee response regime, which includes both camp confinement policies and
restrictions on the provision of assistance to refugees in urban areas – up to criminalizing
urban settlement. Yet amidst mass influxes of “new refugees”, refugees continued to flee
to urban areas in significant numbers, as they had since the birth of the international
refugee regime. What changed was not the refugees themselves, but perceptions of what
these refugees wanted and needed.

2.1 Defining the Refugee Master Category
As described by C.W. Mills, a “master category” is a definitional concept that permits
academics, policy-makers, government representatives, and the public to describe and
analyse a particular subject. A master category draws clear boundaries around a subject,
simultaneously establishing both the scope and limitations of analysis and creating order
within a world of chaotic and often overlapping social constructs. The “refugee”
classification acts as a master category, and has significant connotations in the popular
imagination. The term “refugee” is legally defined in the Refugee Convention and
Protocol as a person who,
… owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or
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who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to return to it.
However, in the public consciousness, refugeehood has evolved and taken on new
meaning. It is in the realm of popular imagination that Roger Zetter’s fracturing of the
refugee label occurs, as states and policy-makers increasingly use terms such as
“genuine” or “legitimate” refugees in contrast to “bogus” or “illegal” refugees and
asylum-seekers61, who are offered varying degrees of assistance and protection. As Zetter
argues, “the proliferation of new labels designating different kinds of refugee claimants
underpins a deliberately transformative process to create far less preferential categories of
temporary protection.”62 Similarly, the application of the term “refugee” to emerging
issues – such as environmental refugees or tax refugees – confuses both the legal
underpinnings and humanitarian origins of the international refugee regime. The
application of the refugee label, as opposed to the use of “refugee” in a legal context,
illustrates how an essentially bureaucratic process is used to manage refugees, “and thus
manage an image [in order to] produce highly discriminatory labels designed to mediate
the interests of the state to control in-migration.”63 The fracturing of the refugee label, or
the proliferation of additional labels within the refugee master category, functions to
remove people from an international regime whose very existence illustrates their need
for protection. It is in this realm that the refugee label becomes both heavy with
connotation, but devoid of meaning.
However, despite this fracturing, certain assumptions about what it means to be a
refugee remain embedded in the public consciousness. These assumptions are so firmly
embedded in refugee discourse that they take on the appearance of fundamentality in
structuring popular understandings of displacement and refugeehood – and, subsequently,
in developing refugee response and management policies. These characteristics are
described by Michel Agier and B.S. Chimni in contrast both to refugees and refugeehood
in the Cold War era and to the refugee definition articulated in the Refugee Convention
and Protocol. Agier’s and Chimni’s analyses prove helpful in articulating these
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characteristics and in describing the characteristics – and boundaries – of the refugee
“master category”.
Chimni and Agier describe assumptions of the causes and sources of
displacement. Both argue that since the Cold War, the causes of displacement have
evolved from primarily political-ideological, individualized persecution to general
violence and intra-state conflict – or what Zetter refers to as “muted conditions for
refugeehood”64 – contributing to changing interpretations of the refugee label. Examples
of such general violence and intra-state conflict may include ongoing civil conflict and
persecution of minority clans in Somalia, or violence against Darfuri or Nuba Sudanese.
Similarly, the countries in which refugee-producing circumstances occur have been
increasingly geographically concentrated in the developing world – that is, Africa, Asia
and Southeast Asia rather than Eastern Europe and Russia – leading to the racialization of
refugeehood since the end of the Cold War. While Chimni describes shifting political
understandings of refuge and refugeehood based on these changes as the “myth of
difference”, Agier adopts a more politically-charged phrase – “the undesirables”65 – to
describe “new refugees” based on the international community’s response to their
displacement.
Descriptions of both the causes and sources of “new refugees’” displacement lend
themselves to the assumption that flight, rather than affecting individuals and families, is
increasingly a phenomenon that affects large numbers of people, up to and including
entire communities, resulting in mass displacement. Generalized violence, or persecution
targeting a particular community, clan, or ethnic group, has contributed to mass
displacement throughout the developing world, particularly since the end of the Cold
War. For example, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, internal conflict in Somalia led to
the displacement of approximately 50,000 refugees into Kenya in 2009 alone – despite
the Kenyan government closing its border with Somalia in 200766. Such causality was
formally recognized in the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Convention). This causality has
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become as significant in shaping public perceptions of refugeehood in contrast to the
legal requirement for individualized persecution; in the public sphere, for example,
refugees are frequently referred to as “huddled masses”67. Assumptions about the
characteristics of refugees from the developing world also contribute to the association
between refugeehood and mass displacement. For instance, belief in cultural traits – such
as the nature of familial or communal ties – add to a belief that displacement from
particular regions or ethno-cultural groups will necessarily be en mass. Therefore, the
“myth of difference” described by both Chimni and Agier contribute to the belief that
refugeehood is inherently a condition that affects people en masse.
Agier further discusses the role of exceptionality in defining the refugee master
category. The exceptionality of refugeehood refers to the understanding that being a
refugee is an abnormal condition, and implies that an unusual, often immediate response
is required. As discussed, Agier argues that refugees, owing largely to misguided refugee
policies, are held in protracted states of emergency in refugee camps. The camp model
itself is based on emergency response principles intended to provide exceptional
assistance to large numbers of individuals and families; similar response activities are
undertaken in cases where significant numbers of people are displaced due to natural
disasters. However, policies that intend to provide exceptional, emergency assistance is
inadequate for sustaining refugees over an extended period of time. For example, food
rations provided on an emergency basis often meet only minimum nutritional and caloric
standards as it is assumed that, at some point, the emergency will end and those receiving
assistance will resume sustaining themselves independently. Food rations are not a
sustainable solution for refugees residing in camps for decades or more – particularly
refugee children, who have greater nutritional requirements over the long term. Further,
over the long term, funding for a particular camp often plateaus or decreases, as donor
attention shifts to other priorities, making it difficult to provide even basic food, shelter,
health care, and education as the duration of displacement increases. While an
exceptional, emergency response to large-scale displacement may be justified from an
operational perspective, maintaining such a response in light of the prevalence of longterm, protracted displacement is ineffective and unsustainable.
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Drawing on the example of refugee camps, Agier describes an emergency
response which has become a normal state of being in order to justify the continued
provision of humanitarian aid68. By emphasizing a shared sense of exceptionality,
combined with effective imprisonment in marginalized camps – discussed further in the
following chapter – Agier notes that a sense of abnormality develops around camps: “by
fixing them and gathering them collectively, these other spaces turn their occupants into
permanent deviants, abnormals who are kept at a distance.”69 From a legal standpoint,
refugeehood is further understood as an exceptional condition that occurs only when
states fail or are unable to protect their citizens from persecution; however, practically,
the increasingly protracted nature of displacement has contributed to the effective
normalization of refugeehood among displaced populations. Exceptionality is, indeed, a
significant area of divergence between the legal foundations of refugeehood and the
refugee master category on one hand, and the reality of contemporary displacement on
the other. Exacerbated by policies that institutionalize states of emergency and
abnormality, the belief that refugeehood is an exceptional condition has become both
entrenched in public concepts of refuge and internalized by refugees themselves.
Finally, Agier discusses an insistence on the temporary nature of refugeehood;
with reference to refugee camps, Agier notes, “the humanitarian sites are supposed to be
precarious, always provisional. The principle implies that the official end of a war is
followed by departure of refugees and the closure of the camp.”70 The temporality of
refugeehood is closely related to the exceptionality of refugeehood, and refers to the
belief that seeking refuge or being a refugee is a fundamentally temporary condition. Like
exceptionality, the temporality of refugee status is implied in the refugee definition
articulated by the Refugee Convention and Protocol, yet conflicts with the effective
permanence of refugeehood in a growing number of cases. For example, in addition to
the increasing incidence of protracted displacement, refugees face significant challenges
accessing durable solutions other than voluntary repatriation – either local integration or
resettlement. UNHCR primarily measures local integration by the ability of refugees to
access citizenship through the naturalization process. However, given that most states
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utilize either jus sanginis or jus solis – or a combination thereof – to grant citizenship,
refugees face substantive obstacles to obtaining citizenship, and by extension, local
integration. Many key host states, such as Egypt, refuse to recognize local integration as a
solution for refugees, arguing instead that their role as a host state should be temporary,
and matched by the availability of resettlement to third countries because they lack the
resources to protect and assist refugees71. On the other hand, the extremely small
numbers of resettlement spaces available globally – less than 100,000 spaces annually –
make accessing resettlement challenging72. In combination with the increasing reliance of
Western states on a non-entrée refugee policy regime, refugees have limited options for
accessing durable solutions other than voluntary repatriation.
Despite the preference of resettlement states for voluntary repatriation73, there are
numerous cases in which voluntary repatriation is not a viable option. The permanence of
refugeehood can be compounded by the unwillingness of refugees to return to their
country of origin, and by their inability to return home due to conditions in the country of
origin. Chimni offers an example of assumptions of the temporality of refugeehood by
describing persistent assertions that “new refugees” want to return home as soon as
possible74. Giorgio Agamben, in illustrating the fallacy of this assumption, describes
circumstances in which the bonds between citizen and state are so thoroughly severed
that becoming stateless is preferable to returning to the country of origin. Though
Agamben’s comments were made in relation to stateless persons rather than refugees in
particular, his observation is equally relevant in instances of state persecution. While not
applicable in every case of displacement, it is certainly important to recognize that, in
many cases, refugees have no desire to return home, whether because they fear ongoing
persecution or because they believe they have access to greater livelihood opportunities
elsewhere. Where refugees have no desire to return to their country of origin,
refugeehood becomes a permanent and normal condition, rather than temporary and
exceptional condition. Agier and Agamben’s comments illustrate the divide between the
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assumption that the temporality of refugee is based primarily on the will of refugees, and
the reality that many refugees do not wish to return but rather to build new lives in
asylum or resettlement states. When refugees can neither integrate into countries of first
asylum, move forward to resettlement states, nor return to their countries of origin, they
become trapped in a state of permanent temporality.
Equally important in interrogating the assumed temporality of refugeehood is the
increasing incidence of protracted displacement. UNHCR defines protracted
displacement as that which lasts for over five years, during which a refugee’s basic rights
and social, economic and psychological needs are unfulfilled in the asylum state.
Currently, approximately seven million refugees are facing protracted displacement –
two-thirds of the total population of refugees globally75. Further, in contrast to
approaches to durable solutions taken prior to and during the Cold War, the international
community is less likely to offer resettlement opportunities to refugees, leaving a
significant number of individuals and families with only one option: attempt to rebuild
their lives in asylum states, which offer little assistance and few economic opportunities.
Where asylum states accept refugees with the understanding that they will be either
resettled or repatriated when appropriate, denying refugees the opportunity to settle
within their borders, the temporality of refugeehood is even more pronounced. However,
in such cases, temporality is imposed by the circumstances and structural conditions of
displacement rather than a characteristic inherent to refugeehood.
These assumptions form essential characteristics of the refugee master category.
Agier suggests that, in contrast to those in political exile prior to and during the Cold
War, who “carried with them a powerful ideological message and a sense of personal
honour,”76 contemporary refugees experience displacement as, “an accumulation of
losses, rejection and flights, of family, administrative or material imbroglios, the only
outcome of which, for those who experience it, is to have themselves as victims and
receive emergency humanitarian aid.”77 This conceptualization views refugees as
perpetual victims who are unable to help themselves, and eliminates the voices of
individual refugees from structuring the international response. Based on these
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characteristics, as emphasized by states, international organizations and the media, the
“ideal” refugee – or those who most closely adhere to the refugee master category – is
one who is part of a collective movement, and who exists in a prolonged state of
emergency and temporality. The mass displacement of Somalis into Kenya, of Burmese
into Thailand, or of Afghans into Pakistan offer examples of displacement that adheres to
the refugee master category.

2.2. Conclusion: Inclusions, Exclusions, and Practical Implications of the Refugee
Master Category

Before turning to the impact of the refugee master category on concepts of refugeehood
and refugee response policies, it is important to recall Saskia Sassen’s critique of master
categories generally. Sassen argues that master categories obscure as much as they
illuminate, and that over time, develop their own “power logics and exclusions” 78. From
this perspective, the following section discusses first, who is included in the refugee
master category and who is excluded from it, and second, the practical implications of
these inclusions and exclusions on refugee policy.
Based on the refugee master category's characteristics, as identified by Agier,
Chimni, Agamben, and others, a refugee construct emerges that parallels the
displacement experiences of many refugees in Africa and Asia throughout the 1990s – for
example, displacement of Somalis into Kenya, of Burmese into Thailand, or of Afghans
into Pakistan. Indeed, as discussed, the foundations of the contemporary refugee
construct are to be found in this period. Such refugee movements are characterised by
large-scale flight triggered by a specific, exceptional event. The exceptionality of the
event justifies the emergency measures taken in response. It is assumed that, once the
trigger event is appropriately dealt with, refugees will return home, their displacement is
understood as temporary. Refugees are thus perceived – and defined by international
refugee law – as large numbers of people displaced by exceptional events and on a
temporary basis.
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Given this characterisation, it is possible to rationalize response policies that
favour containment, provided that displacement is, in fact, temporary. It is within this
context that policies such as camp confinement – discussed further in Chapter 3 –
emerged. However, as noted, significant numbers of refugees cannot and/or will not
confirm to this construct. Many are fleeing by themselves, rather than en masse. Many
are fleeing not single, exceptional events, but constant and ongoing persecution – such as
ongoing persecution of Darfuri and Nuba people in Sudan. Many are fleeing situations
that make it impossible to return, or who have no desire to return to their country of
origin – such as Eritreans fleeing conscription who face imprisonment, torture, and
possibly death at the hands of the government if they return. Many have the awareness
and agency to make decisions about how they wish to protect themselves and their
families – such as well-educated, middle-class Iraqis settling in Cairo. Refugees fleeing
such circumstances are entitled to the same rights to protection and services, yet are often
disadvantaged by policies directed solely to refugees within the narrow, politicallymotivated definition of the refugee master category – namely those who settle in
designated refugee camps.
International refugee law can be understood as intimately related to the refugee
master category, in that the refugee master category provides the conceptual framework
through which refugee law is interpreted and translated into refugee policy. When the
relationship between the refugee master category, refugee law, and refugee policy is
understood in this way – as cyclical and self-reinforcing – it is possible to understand,
though problematic, how treatment of refugees has changed so dramatically when
international refugee law has remained largely static. Even more problematic is the
inability of either international refugee law or the refugee master category to adequately
describe contemporary displacement. Given the significance of the refugee master
category as the conceptual framework through which responses to contemporary
displacement are formulated, it is essential to ask, what are the implications of the
inclusions and exclusions inherent in the refugee master category, as currently
constructed, on refugee policy?
As discussed, the refugee master category has become biased toward camp-based
refugees, favouring an outdated refugee construct rather than evolving in tandem with
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contemporary displacement. Camp-based refugees conform to the international refugee
regime’s insistence that refugeehood is an exceptional, temporary circumstance that
affects people en masse, whereas urban refugees contradict these understandings of
refugeehood by their individualized flight, their desire to normalize their status, and the
effective permanence of their displacement. Yet within the policy-making context,
governments and policy-makers are constrained in their ability to adapt to changes in
refugee discourse by the necessity of developing and implementing refugee policy.
Policy-making attempts to categorize the socio-political realm in order to effectively
respond to issues and events. However, when the categories upon which response policies
are based are flawed, the response will typically be ineffective. These inefficiencies – or,
in the parlance of the refugee regime, service and protection gaps – are discussed further
in Chapter 5.
Though the camp-centric refugee response regime that developed in response to
post-Cold War understandings of refugeehood – the foundations of the refugee master
category – was built on a particular operational logic, that logic was limited to a specific
set of circumstances. These circumstances portrayed displacement as collective,
exceptional, and temporary, suited to situations of mass displacement as opposed to
individualized, permanent displacement during the Cold War. Contrary to the
propagation of the refugee master category described above, refugees continued – and
continue to – settle in urban areas rather than camp settings. This trend has, historically,
been the constant, while camp-based settlement has been the exception, emerging only
since the end of the Cold War. For example, in Kenya prior to the 1990s, refugees were
generally permitted to self-settle on a largely permanent basis, leading to frequent
settlement in urban centres such as Nairobi; camp confinement has only emerged since
the early 1990s and has not been entirely effective in curbing urban settlement among
refugees79. Although camp-based policies had a significant initial impact on refugee
settlement patterns, since the early 2000s the proportion of UNHCR’s persons of concern
living in urban areas has increased dramatically and consistently. Whereas only one
percent of persons of concern lived in urban areas in 1996, approximately eighteen
percent had settled in urban areas by 2005, and approximately twenty-seven percent in
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200780. This figure has stabilized over the past five years, while the proportion of
refugees residing in camps has dropped to twelve percent81.
Despite their numerical minority, camp-based refugees possess an advantage in
that their settlement patterns conform to the construct advanced by the refugee master
category. Further, their settlement patterns benefit dominant states in that, as Agier
illustrates, they are both marginal and confined largely to the developing world.
Promoting camp-based settlement, by, for example, criminalizing settlement outside
designated camps and restricting assistance provided to refugees outside of camps, is thus
preferred by both host governments and Western states, despite the significant number of
refugees settling in urban areas. Through the 1990s and 2000s, refugee response policymaking came to be dominated by the belief that the exception – camp-based settlement –
was, in fact, the rule. The ensuing policy regime, characterised by policies that perpetuate
the refugee master category, thus favours the exception, resulting in a policy regime that
fails to consider the needs of a significant portion of the refugee population. When the
assumptions underlying the refugee policy regime have so clearly failed to evolve in
tandem with the realities of contemporary displacement, and result in flawed policies that
dedicate the vast majority of limited national and international resources to a subgroup
while neglecting the needs of the refugee population at large, it is essential to re-evaluate
these assumptions against actual experiences of displacement and the protection and
assistance needs of refugees writ large.
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Chapter 3: EMERGENCE OF THE CAMP-CENTRIC REFUGEE RESPONSE
REGIME – KENYA’S CAMP CONFINMENT POLICIES

Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, responses to refugee-producing
situations came to rely on large-scale refugee camps. In many ways, camps have
effectively become a defining feature of refuge and refugeehood, particularly in the
developing world. This chapter reviews the emergence of camp-centric response policies
through a case study of Kenya’s camp confinement policies. Camp confinement policies
require refugees to remain in designated areas, and make it illegal for refugees to live
elsewhere except under exceptional circumstances. Such policies have been adopted in a
number of African countries, particularly Kenya and Uganda, and in 2002, over eighty
percent of refugees assisted by UNHCR resided in refugee camps82. The evolution of
refugee response policies in Kenya, including the emergence of camp confinement as the
primary mechanism for dealing with refugees, is indicative of the role camps play in the
geopolitics of refugeehood. While camp confinement policies serve a practical purpose in
creating a “captive audience” for humanitarian assistance, they also illustrate a desire to
maintain the temporality and exceptionality of refuge in host countries, and of the state of
refugeehood itself.
Government and international policy responses to refugee situations reveal their
concepts of and attitudes toward refugees. Camp confinement policies serve geopolitical
and strategic functions in maintaining the segregation of refugees from domestic
populations. Over the course of the twentieth century, response policies have evolved,
depending on the geopolitical and strategic value governments assign to refugees. Since
the end of the Cold War, dominant states have assigned progressively less strategic
significance to refugees and refugee protection. A growing emphasis on refugee camps,
enforced through camp confinement policies, suggests that dominant states feel little
moral, legal or strategic obligation to assist refugees by either accepting refugees into
their territory or encouraging host states to permit refugees to pursue independent
livelihoods through legal, economic, and social integration. Instead, dominant states seek
their marginalization and confinement in territories other than their own. This chapter
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undertakes a critical historical investigation of camp confinement policies, locating these
policies in their geopolitical context. Based on the evolution of refugee camps and camp
confinement policies, this chapter argues that a camp-centric approach to refugee
situations forms part of a political strategy that seeks to confine refugees in marginal
areas, and in doing so, advance a specific conceptualization of refugees that is
progressively less useful in describing contemporary displacement experiences.
The objectives of this chapter are to understand the political context giving rise to
camp confinement policies; to illuminate whose interests are served by camp
confinement policies, and what effects they have on refugees writ large (including noncamp refugees and those who leave camps, sometimes irregularly); and to illustrate camp
confinement policies as both drawing on and feeding into a particular conceptualization
of refugees that obscures diversity and excludes significant numbers of vulnerable
individuals who do not fall within the vision propounded by these policies. To achieve
these objectives, the chapter will address the political and historical context of camp
confinement policies. Drawing on the Kenyan case, the chapter will evaluate the political
environment within which camp confinement policies have developed. How have
concepts of the geopolitical and strategic value of refugees evolved, and has this
evolution contributed to the development of camp confinement policies? As refugees are
increasingly politicized, what goals do camp confinement policies seek to achieve, and
are they successful in achieving these political goals? Whose interests do camp
confinement policies serve, and who benefits from their application? At the international
level, do camp confinement policies achieve their objectives and meet the goals of host
governments and/or the international community?

3.1 Refugees in Politico-Historical Context
Before reviewing B.S. Chimni’s work, which offers insights into the politico-historical
context surrounding the emergence of camp confinement policies since the end of the
Cold War, it is helpful to briefly outline the practical impact of the Cold War, and its
conclusion, on refugees. The international refugee regime as currently structured is
founded upon massive displacement within Europe between World Wars I and II. Aware
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that the international community was not capable of protecting all displaced persons in
Europe, prioritization was enshrined in the international refugee protection regime based
on concepts of fundamental, “universal” human rights – particularly civil and political
rights, despite disputes between Western and Eastern blocs over whether these were
indeed fundamental or universal. Further, at the outset, the international refugee regime
was formulated to care for European refugees, rather than refugees from other regions. In
these nascent years the international refugee regime was never intended to protect
displaced persons on a global scale. Although the 1967 Refugee Protocol removed
geographic and temporal limitations on international refugee law, this universalization
was formal rather than substantive, in particular because established refugee criteria were
not re-evaluated to consider displacement as a result of non-civil or political grounds83.
These weaknesses were obscured with the rise of the Cold War, as preoccupations
with maintaining the binary balance between the Soviet Union (the east) and the United
States (the west) took centre stage. Both Chimni and Michel Agier argue that, during the
Cold War, refugees took on greater strategic political value in international relations.
Refugees fleeing from within the Communist bloc were taken to represent the flaws of
the Communist ideology, and Western governments accepted them on a largely
permanent basis, acting as “the land of asylum for the ‘good’ victims of communism.”84
Within both Eastern and Western spheres of influence, dominant states had an interest in
projecting an image of stability, making early intervention and conflict resolution a
strategic priority. Where spheres of influence clashed, resulting in the threat of proxy
wars, dominant states had an interest in resolution to protect the international balance of
power, encouraging early intervention to restore stability – stability which frequently
prevented mass refugee movements.
The end of the Cold War removed the strategic motivation for intervention in
refugee producing conflicts and regions. Almost immediately, regions that had previously
been of strategic importance were abandoned by dominant states, the incidence of regime
collapse and state failure rose dramatically, and economic woes deepened. Public and
political opinions toward refugee movements in regions such as Africa and Asia had also
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shifted: state failure was blamed on internal, rather than international causes, while
refugees who were able to make their way to the West were portrayed as economic
migrants rather than “true” refugees. As Roger Zetter argues, the refugee label has
become increasingly fractured, resulting in the “proliferation of new labels designating
different kinds of refugee claimants, [underpinning] a deliberately transformative process
to create far less preferential categories of temporary protection.”85 Further, the use of
degrading labels such as “illegal asylum-seeker” or “bogus asylum-seeker” have been
used to embed marginality and dishonesty into understandings of “new refugees”86.
These labelling processes obscure the increasingly complex nature of forced migration,
particularly in relation to mixed migration, where forced and voluntary migrants use the
same routes – and where an individual migrant can be considered both forced and
voluntary, depending on the weight assigned to each factor motivating their movement.
This phenomenon was, in part, due to increasingly strict interpretations of
international refugee law, emphasizing civil and political causes of flight rather than
generalized violence, natural disaster, and economic upheaval, which are more frequently
at the root of displacement within the developing world. The changing causality behind
refugee flows has not been explicitly accounted for in international refugee law, allowing
states to reject asylum-seekers on the basis that the factors leading to their flight do not fit
the criteria outlined in the Refugee Convention and Protocol. Though the 1969 OAU
Convention recognized generalized violence as a legitimate cause for granting refugee
status, the Convention is only applicable in states who are party to it – that is, OAU
members – while criteria established in the Refugee Convention and Protocol remain
applicable in most other states. The need for the 1969 OAU Convention’s expanded
definition at all illustrates the failure of international refugee law to keep up with the
changing causality of forced migration.
Internationally, the Refugee Convention and Protocol have been interpreted by
Western states in an exclusionary rather than inclusionary manner, limiting the ability of
“new refugees” to obtain refugee status in the West87. In the post-Cold War world, fewer
and fewer refugees are considered “legitimate” refugees by the West; marginalization and
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containment, as Chimni and Agier discuss, translate this perception into policy. The
impact of these interpretations are overtly visible in the West, as governments favour
non-entrée regimes that increasingly restrict refugees from the developing world from
accessing protection, and in the developing world, policies such as camp confinement
create physical separation.

3.2 Refugees in Kenya: From Self-Settlement to Camp Containment

Prior to the 1990s, Kenya was generally hospitable to refugees arriving at its borders.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Kenya hosted between 12,000 and 15,000 refugees, largely
from Uganda. These refugees were typically granted “full status rights”88, including
access to work permits and the educational system, as well as the right to apply for legal
integration through naturalization. This liberal treatment served both political and
economic functions. Granting refuge to victims of oppression and those fleeing apartheid
regimes was politically “generous”, and a logical extension of the government’s support
for liberation movements in surrounding states89. At the time Kenya suffered from a
shortage of labour, particularly skilled labour, which refugees from professional
backgrounds could fill. Additionally, refugees from professional classes were viewed as a
source of new investment90. Finally, relatively small numbers of refugees arriving each
year were fairly easily managed within the government’s reception and assistance
structures.
The 1990s brought political upheaval in East Africa, triggering dramatic increases
in refugee movements. Internal strife and civil war emerged in Ethiopia, Sudan and
Somalia and despite the restoration of peace in Uganda, drought conditions beginning in
1985 pushed many to seek more favourable conditions in Kenya. In the aftermath, the
number of refugees in Kenya rose from 12,000 to 15,000 throughout the 1980s to around
400,000 in 1992, stabilizing at 220,000 near the end of the decade91. The Kenyan
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government’s capacity to receive and respond to this influx was quickly overwhelmed. Its
main reception facility at Thika, for example, had a maximum capacity of only 500
refugees, forcing new arrivals to settle in the surrounding area.
At the same time, Kenya faced challenges that effectively crippled its domestic
economy. Ongoing financial hardship forced the government to seek assistance from the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which imposed a structural adjustment
program on Kenya. Based on neoliberal economic principles, the program required
drastic cuts in government spending, resulting in less government funding for the national
asylum system. Lacking both the institutional and financial capacity to accommodate the
mass influx of refugees seeking protection, the government of Kenya pulled out of
refugee response operations and transferred responsibility to UNHCR. As Avery Burns
suggests, “it is difficult for Kenyans to want to help others when they seem unable to help
themselves.”92 Almost immediately, UNHCR established massive refugee camps,
primarily in Dadaab and Kakuma, channeling aid to these settlements. In order to ensure
refugees were “UNHCR’s problem”93, Kenya implemented policies requiring refugees to
remain in UNHCR’s camps, making it illegal for refugees to leave the camps and settle
elsewhere without government-issued permits.
To be sure, camp confinement policies serve an operational objective: creating a
“captive audience” which can be provided with targeted humanitarian assistance. Faced
with mass refugee influxes, states and aid agencies are challenged with responding to
significant housing, medical and sustenance needs, which proves particularly challenging
when those requiring assistance are geographically dispersed. When self-settlement is
permitted, identifying individuals and families at risk, let alone providing assistance,
becomes significantly more complicated. As Karen Jacobsen argues, in the context of
self-settlement, refugees become part of two larger sub-groups within a national
population: urban poor, in the case of urban self-settlement – or, more generally,
impoverished communities – and foreign-born residents94. Both of these populations face
obstacles accessing the livelihood resources necessary for survival. Given that, for many
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refugees, one of the key benefits of self-settlement is anonymity, self-settled refugees
often seek to minimize their contact with authorities, creating self-imposed limitations on
their ability to access humanitarian services. In addition to these obstacles, refugees often
face psycho-social barriers to survival, including physical and mental health issues
resulting from trauma experienced during their displacement and flight. In contrast,
refugees in camp settings are relatively easily reached, eliminating many of the logistical
barriers to service provision present in contexts of self-settlement. However, living
conditions in camps are often poor; basic sanitation infrastructure poses a significant and
ongoing challenge for camp administrators, let alone ensuring that educational and
medical resources are available to meet demands. Further, as Jeff Crisp argues, camps
often suffer from poor security, leaving refugees vulnerable to physical threats which
camp administrators are unable to counter95. Lacking the ability to engage in productive
activity in camps, refugees from both urban and rural backgrounds find themselves
grappling to adapt to a life characterised by dependency. From the refugee’s perspective,
self-settlement often seems the lesser of two evils, despite the significant vulnerabilities
they face outside of the theoretical protection of the refugee camp.
In Kenya, refugees choosing to self-settle in contravention of camp confinement
policies effectively become irregular migrants, and are vulnerable to arrest and detention.
The Kenyan government, conducts frequent “round-ups” or sweeps in areas of Nairobi
and other cities where refugees are known to congregate, either forcing refugees to return
to camps or forcibly repatriating them to countries of origin in violation of the customary
law principle of non-refoulement. These sweeps are justified on the basis that Kenyan
refugee law requires refugees to reside in camps, and that Article 2 of the Refugee
Convention and Protocol obligates refugees to conform to the laws and regulations of
host states – although neither consider the implications of conflict between national
refugee law and internationally guaranteed human rights and freedoms, such as freedom
of movement. While the Kenyan government may be within its rights to enforce its law
governing the residence of refugees by returning them to camps, the principle of nonrefoulement suggests that refugees should not be returned to places of harm even in cases
where they contravene national laws.
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The irregular status of those outside of the camps permits the government to
characterise these refugees as criminal. As Elizabeth Campbell suggests, “keeping urban
refugees [in Nairobi] in a state of legal limbo benefits the government, which uses them
as a scapegoat for a wide variety of social and economic ills plaguing the city.”96 Police
harassment thus becomes a fact of everyday life, further isolating refugees opting for selfsettlement from both Kenyan society and aid agencies, which are generally prohibited
from assisting refugees outside of camps.

3.2.1 The Government of Kenya and Refugees in Kenya: Security, Isolation and
Enduring Temporality

This isolation, however, is not merely an unintended consequence of camp confinement
policies. Camp confinement has become a strategic political tool, in addition to its
operational logic. In Kenya, isolation is justified in part on security grounds. Throughout
the late twentieth century, Kenya has been the victim of terrorist attacks and threats that
Somalia will attempt to annex its Northeastern Province. Since the rise of Al-Shabaab,
the Kenyan government has been particularly concerned about the possibility of the
group’s penetration into refugee camps. A 1997 news report stated that:
President Moi yesterday said foreign spies and criminals masquerading as
refugees had invaded Nairobi. President Moi revealed that some of these
criminals were engaged in incitement at the behest of local collaborators.
Emphasizing that the government will not allow foreigners to abuse the
peace and stability in the country, President Moi said that many of them
were engaged in business as a cover-up for their evil activities.97
In 1998, Al Qaeda bombed the US Embassy in Nairobi, and in 2002, a series of hotel
bombings rocked Mombasa. These events, among others, set the stage for increasing
securitization of refugee management policy, leading to government crackdowns on
refugees living in Nairobi and increased security around refugee camps. The government
went so far as to place former army officers in refugee camps to “support” aid workers in
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addressing “security issues”98. Isolation, or containment, thus took on a role of preventing
the “infiltration” of terrorist groups into Kenyan society under the guise of refugeehood.
Camp confinement policies also serve to reinforce the temporality of refuge.
Isolation, whether in camp or urban settings, prevents refugees from integrating into the
national population, emphasizing the temporary nature of their presence in the country.
Isolation emphasizes the presumed “extreme material precariousness, and the feeling that
those people who settle there will remain only for a short period.”99 By maintaining a
state of temporality, the Kenyan government is able to shift the burden of dealing with
refugees – economically, socially, materially, and so on – to alternative actors, such as
UNHCR and humanitarian agencies, over both the short- and long-term. Physical
isolation, while ostensibly focused toward addressing and containing security threats,
contributes to the overall marginalization of refugees within host states such as Kenya.

3.2.2 UNHCR and Refugees in Kenya: Physical Marginalization and Externalization

As the major facilitator of global refugee assistance and policy implementation, UNHCR
legitimizes the containment of refugees in camps. In order to assist refugees and
displaced persons, UNHCR requires the invitation and approval of host states, which also
develop the policy framework within which UNHCR must operate. The presence of
UNHCR in a country contributes to the attitude of externalization by removing
responsibility for the refugee “problem” from host states. In the Kenyan case, as in other
states opting for a camp confinement approach, UNHCR enforces this policy direction by
providing aid only in camp settings. When viewed in the context of the strategic
importance of the refugee construct, UNHCR’s actions are essential in facilitating
ongoing physical marginalization and externalization.
Polzer and Hammond argue that, “by seeing, describing and categorizing social
reality, we also make people and processes invisible.”100 Applying concepts of visibility
and invisibility to “self-settled” refugees, Polzer and Hammond discuss how both
governments and UNHCR seek to manage the visibility of refugee subsets to serve
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institutional interests. For example, by managing the (in)visibility of its subjects,
governments and agencies can restrict the scope of their obligations to provide protection
or assistance101. Invisibility, these authors contend, is the outcome of relationships
between those with power and those without: “invisibility is therefore fundamentally
relational; its impacts depend on the power relations and interests connecting those who
see and those who are to be seen (or not).”102 Keeping people and processes invisible
requires power and institutions that have such power can impose visibility or invisibility
against the will of their subjects. By allowing relying on camp-based solutions and failing
to advocate for the ability to assist refugees outside of camp settings, UNHCR is
complicit in the Kenyan government’s attempts to make refugees structurally invisible
through the enforcement of camp confinement policies.

3.3 Camp Confinement and the International Community

In Kenya and elsewhere, the containment of refugees in camps not only shifts the burden
of management to UNHCR and other non-state actors, it also ensures that refugees
remain apart from the domestic population. In this way, camps function to marginalize
and isolate refugees from the domestic population, preventing their permanent
integration, and to externalize refugees by shifting the “burden” to UNHCR and other
non-state actors. Refugee treatment in Kenya is reflective of the emphasis by dominant
states that displaced populations should remain as much in-situ as possible and only as a
last resort be offered resettlement. While camp confinement policies are not entirely
effective at restricting the movement of refugees, they are successful in effecting the
containment of refugees, as Agier suggests, on the margins of the world – first, far from
the borders of powerful, Western states, and second, in remote areas within host states in
the developing world. According to geographer Luc Cambrezy, accommodating refugees
in camp settings has become “the speciality of poor countries”103. Agier describes those
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in camps as “a population reduced to the sole imperative of keeping alive far from home,
in places of waiting.”104
Since the conclusion of the Cold War, camp confinement has come to
characterize the vast majority of refugee experiences in Africa, as well as Asia. The
geopolitical and strategic value assigned to refugees has plummeted. The parallel
overriding emphasis on containment in camps, now almost exclusively located in the
developing world, is closely linked to the political self-interest that is at the heart of the
international community’s attitudes toward refugees. Rather than permitting refugees
entry into dominant, Western states through resettlement, these states, through UNHCR,
encourage a “care and maintenance” approach based on the belief that repatriation should
be pursued as the primary solution for refugees – regardless of the fact that, for many
residing in camps, displacement has become protracted and will likely continue for the
foreseeable future. Camp confinement has become, “a massive and lasting solution, and
clearly the preferred one in Africa and Asia, to the detriment of the other three solutions:
repatriation, integration in the land of asylum, and resettlement in a third country.”105
Given the poor living conditions in camps and the obstacles put in place that prevent
refugees from actualizing their internationally guaranteed human rights in such settings, it
can be argued that camp confinement primarily benefits dominant states rather than
refugees themselves.
Camp confinement plays a role in maintaining the conceptual foundations of the
international refugee regime. Insistence on containment of refugees in marginal areas, far
from the shores of dominant states, and in a state of extended temporality allows for the
perpetuation of a refugee concept which portrays refugees to the public and to policymakers as transitory, external subjects – “the most distant [and] the least visible”106.
When the confinement of refugees to camps in marginal areas – typically in the
developing world – is accepted as a defining characteristic of refugeehood, the
manipulation of the international refugee regime to achieve this end, as illustrated by
Chimni, becomes palatable to the public consciousness107. Camp confinement policies
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facilitate the maintenance of a self-reinforcing dialectic by requiring refugees to adhere to
a particular definitional construct or face consequences, ranging from the withdrawal of
humanitarian assistance to arrest, detention, and refoulement. Once refugee behaviour is
conditioned to conform to this construct, response policies based on this construct – such
as camp confinement policies – may be more easily formulated and legitimized.

3.4 Conclusion

Refugee camps have become a common mechanism for responding to displaced
populations, particularly in the latter decades of the twentieth century. Refugees early in
the twentieth century – those fleeing conflicts in Europe, such as the Spanish civil war, or
from Eastern Europe during the Cold War – tended to have similar political experiences
with democracy and diversity in their host communities and states. The involvement of
dominant states such as the US, Great Britain and France in many of these conflicts
carried with it a desire to “save the world”, coloured by an inherent acceptance of
democracy and economic capitalism as the best solution for global peace. More recent
waves of refugees do not share the “European” cultural, religious or political norms and
present a very different set of needs. Since the end of the Cold War the geopolitical
response to mass refugee situations has shifted from one of deliberate and quick response
to one which offers help after the fact and only under well-defined conditions. Two of
those conditions include the approval of a host state to the presence of UNHCR and the
insistence of UNHCR on the distribution of aid only in camp environments. The now
predominant approach of camp confinement as a solution to these “new refugees”
suggests that there is less strategic value assigned to refugees in the latter twentieth and
now, the twenty first century. This decline in strategic value has contributed to the
marginalization and externalization of refugees and the potential creation of large
populations with unavoidably negative attitudes to the dominant states who largely define
the rules for international assistance.
Marginalization and externalization of refugees occurs in three ways: first, by
containing refugees in the developing world, far from the territory of typically wealthy
and healthy Western states; secondly, by physically locating refugees in camps in remote
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areas within host states; and thirdly, by shifting responsibility from governments to
UNHCR. While providing aid to a defined location has clear operational advantages,
camps have become more than they were ever intended to be. Rather than temporary
places of refuge, they have become long-term cities of impoverishment108, where
refugees face poor living conditions, a lack of personal security and livelihood
opportunities, and restrictions on human rights. Camp-based refugees have little control
over their own lives, and their dependence on humanitarian aid is a challenge to their
ability to assert themselves in relation to the humanitarian government that develops
around them109. As Agier notes in describing discussions with camp-settled refugees, “in
a repetitive way, the refugees express above all feelings of impotence and uselessness.”110
Those who choose to leave camps are often targeted as criminal elements and
increasingly cited as politically dangerous to the host state. Long-term confinement also
threatens to increase the radicalization of younger refugees who see a lack of will and
concern from dominant states, rightly or wrongly, as deliberate. At the same time,
dominant states are more and more cautious about who is granted asylum in an effort to
maintain their own internal stability and to show their citizens the positive impacts of
nation-building through immigration. The camp confinement strategy, rather than
offering a temporary solution to sustain large numbers of people while a more durable
solution can be found, has evolved into a tactic of avoiding permanent settlement for
large numbers of displaced populations.
After many decades of using refugee camps to respond to protracted conflicts in
the developing world with no noticeable improvement in the outcomes for either host
states or the hundreds of thousands of refugees, one wonders what critical mass is
necessary to trigger reconsideration by the international community of its response to
long-term mass displacements. This reconsideration must address both weaknesses in
response policies and inaccuracies in constructions of refugeehood that allow for and
perpetuate flawed policies. A refugee master category that is too narrowly biased toward
a particular type of refugee disadvantages those that do not fit within its definitions by
inequitably distributing limited resources and services. When confronted with growing
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proportions of refugees who cannot or will not conform to the refugee master category’s
boundaries, the construct of refugeehood faces challenges both in terms of
conceptualizing refuge more broadly and in terms of providing protection and services to
these refugees.
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Chapter 4: THE URBAN REFUGEE CHALLENGE

Despite the efforts of states to condition refugee behaviour by promoting camp-centric
responses, significant numbers of refugees continue to settle outside of camps and, in so
doing, pose a challenge to the refugee master category. As discussed in Chapter 2, the
refugee master category is defined by its collectivity, its exceptionality, and its
temporality. However, the refugee master category is based on concepts of refugeehood
that reflect the displacement experiences of only a subset of refugees – those conforming
to camp-centric response policies. Refugees who do not conform to this construct are
excluded from protection and assistance, and, as illustrated by the Kenyan case study,
cast as threats to domestic security rather than highly vulnerable individuals and families.
The camp bias exists in refugee policy to reward refugees who fit within the narrow
refugee construct and disadvantage those who cannot or will not adapt.
While camp-centric response policies grew out of operational logic within a
particular context, they must be continually evaluated against the evolving characteristics
of refugeehood. The refugee master category upon which camp-centric policies are
based, aligns with the strategic approach emphasized by dominant, Western states. This
viewpoint arises from a combination of enthusiastic humanitarianism and fear of
involvement. Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal and the United States are well known
as the original colonizers – in many instances not in a benevolent way. Their twentieth
century military success, as well as their rise to economic predominance, has resulted in
them being viewed both as threats and saviours. But faced with fatigue among their
citizens with respect to continued involvement in violent internecine conflicts far from
their shores, these states have become much more wary about rushing in with aid of any
kind. Once too often a toe in the water of humanitarianism has led to a bath of war. This
historical context, while understandable, appears now to be the only lens through which
refugee response policies and practices are viewed. The consequences may be devastating
for all refugees, with urban refugees even more vulnerable to a lack of vision in how to
keep them safe, let alone offer them any hope of returning to a life of peace and stability.
And so it is that refugees are to be hosted far from their territorial jurisdiction, confined
to marginal spaces and kept apart from the host society by emphasizing the temporary
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nature of their refuge. Such policies are now evident throughout Africa, including Kenya,
and South East Asia. Beyond the inequities resulting from the simple mechanics of
insisting on providing aid primarily within organized camp settings is the growing set of
facts regarding a problem which is not going away – that is to say, there are more and
more cases where refugees become caught in a particular place because it is too
dangerous to return home, or it is perceived that there is nothing to return to. The fact that
some refugees chose to settle in urban areas is a testament to perhaps the most significant
failure of camp centric policies – that they fail to come to a proper and lasting end.
Refugee response policies, rather than considering the best interests of refugees
themselves, seek to condition refugee behaviour to conform to the characteristics of the
refugee master category in order to achieve three strategic goals – externalization,
marginalization, and exclusion. This chapter argues that urban refugees contradict the
refugee master category because they pursue living conditions that abide by neither
camp-centric refugee response policies nor the refugee master category – namely, they
seek socio-economic integration into the host society so that they can recover from the
trauma experienced in their country of origin and rebuild their lives.

4.1 Externalization

States pursue three key strategic goals by manipulating the international refugee regime
in their favour: externalization, marginalization, and exclusion. The first strategic goal
pursued by dominant states through the international refugee regime is the externalization
of refugees, or ensuring that refugees are primarily hosted outside their territorial
jurisdiction. Both B.S. Chimni and Michel Agier discuss ongoing attempts to externalize
refugees. For Chimni, the goal of externalization – or, in his words, containment – is a
key motivating factor contributing to the promotion of the non-entrée regime, which
seeks to prevent refugees from entering the Western world. Instead, the non-entrée
regime seeks to confine refugees to the developing world in order to limit the West’s
moral obligation to protect and assist refugees by rejecting the exilic basis of refugeehood
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and removing refugees from Western jurisdiction111. Given that the vast majority of
refugees are hosted in the developing world, far from the territorial jurisdiction of
Western states, it can be argued that the externalization of refugees has largely been
successful. Indeed, as geographer Luc Cambrezy notes, the accommodation of refugees
has largely become “the speciality of poor countries”112.
While Chimni observes this trend most clearly in relation to trends in the
implementation of durable solutions, Agier draws specifically on camp-centric policies to
illustrate the externalization of refugees. Locating camps far from their territorial
jurisdictions, dominant, Western states are able to reify the conceptual division between a
“clean, healthy and visible world” and “the world’s residual ‘remnants’, dark, diseased
and invisible”113. What obligations persist for Western states to assist refugees are
translated as providing assistance to developing states and UNHCR to ensure refugees
can be hosted offshore114. This binary construction frequently manifests itself in debates
over burden-sharing – or burden-shifting – within the international refugee regime. The
camp-centric refugee policy regime plays a key role in legitimating this informal burdensharing, providing a focal point for assistance while disguising the strategic
externalization of refugees as a humanitarian gesture.
Moreover, Agier argues that, in addition to its operational role, the camp-centric
refugee policy regime fills a further role: control. Camps ensure that host states and
international organizations exercise authority over camp residents, including limiting
their freedom of movement. Agier suggests that the development of a camp-based
regime, particularly in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, functioned to “[close] the gates
of the developed world”115. Humanitarian intervention in camps, in addition to disguising
the shifting of the refugee burden to developing states, ensures control over both the
camps and their inhabitants: “every policy of assistance is simultaneously an instrument
of control over its beneficiaries.”116 This control function, through camp-centric policies
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such as camp confinement, conditions the behaviour of refugees in line with both the
refugee master category and the strategic goals of dominant states.

4.2 Marginalization

The second strategic goal pursued by states through the international refugee regime is
the marginalization of refugees within host states. Marginalization of refugees or
containing them in spatially separate areas such as border regions, runs parallel to
externalization in that both seek to keep refugees apart from their host societies.
Interesting – and troubling – has been the growth of this type of treatment to refugees and
asylum-seekers who are able to reach the shores of dominant states. Throughout the
2000s, European states increasingly relied on camp-based approaches to asylum-seekers,
including detention and reception centres, while Australia’s “Pacific Solution” literally
confines asylum-seekers to detention centres on islands off the coast of Australia rather
than permitting them to enter Australian jurisdiction. It is note-worthy that policies
seeking the externalization and marginalization did not originate in the developing world.
Camp-based approaches are utilized by both developing states with encouragement from
dominant, Western states, and by Western states themselves, creating layered buffer
zones as the foundation of the non-entrée regime.
As noted, Chimni discusses the containment of refugees in their region of origin;
the marginalization of refugees within these regions is equally as important as their
externalization from dominant, Western states. Marginalization has the effect of making
refugees confined to camps, virtually invisible to local populations. As Tara Polzer and
Lara Hammond argue, making someone or something invisible requires power117 – in this
case, the power to confine refugees to marginal, frontier spaces, thus restricting their
ability to interact with and integrate into the host society.
Agier suggests that the marginalization of refugees is intended to achieve this
very goal: the separation of refugees from the host society. Locating camps in marginal
areas – in Agier’s words, “out-places” or “spaces of exception”118 – is the physical
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manifestation of the conceptual division between refugees and the host society. These
spatial and conceptual divisions are reified by policies such as camp confinement
policies, which reward camp-settled refugees by providing livelihood resources, but
which punish self-settled refugees by withholding protection and assistance – regardless
of the fact that both are entitled to the same rights and protections under the 1951
Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol. For example, drawing on the Kenyan
case study described in Chapter 2, those seeking refuge in Kenya are required to reside in
a refugee camp, located in marginal, border areas, with those choosing to reside
elsewhere considered irregular immigrants and subject to arrest.. Further, NGOs and
UNHCR are prohibited from offering assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers outside
of camps. A senior immigration official within the Kenyan government defended these
policies in a 1999 interview with Gugliemo Veridrame, saying, “refugees in Kenya
misbehave because they do not want to go to the camps. If someone comes to my home
and I tell him where he has to sit, he has to obey, otherwise he leaves!”119 The Kenyan
government thus seeks to separate refugees from Kenyan society by incorporating
positive and negative reinforcement into policies on refugee settlement.
In addition to preventing local integration, the spatial marginalization of refugees
permits both formal and informal burden-shifting within host states. One of the primary
concerns voiced by host states, particularly within the developing world, is that the state’s
limited resources will be overwhelmed by having to address the material and servicing
needs of large numbers of refugees. Many host states therefore often prefer to limit their
involvement in refugee protection and services as much as possible. When refugees are
spatially segregated in camps, they are unable to access services available to citizens, and
the burden of providing services – with the exception of camp security – is typically
borne by international non-governmental organizations and/or UNHCR. As illustrated by
the Kenyan case study, marginalization has both conceptual and practical benefits for
host states.
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4.3 Exclusion

The third strategic goal pursued by states through the international refugee regime is the
exclusion of refugees from host societies, thus exaggerating the temporary nature of their
refuge and preventing their integration into the host society. Emphasizing the temporality
of refugeehood is achieved both by successful spatial externalization and marginalization,
as well as the conceptual exclusion of refugees from full participation in the socioeconomic, cultural and political life in the host state. From the beginning of the
contemporary international refugee regime, refugee protection was conceived as
temporary, surrogate protection that became active when an individual’s country of origin
failed to offer effective protection. However, as noted, during the Cold War, refugees had
greater strategic and political value, leading dominant, Western states to view
refugeehood as a permanent condition. Refugees originating in Europe during the World
War and Cold War era were accepted more readily as fully functioning members of
“Western” society and, in an era of economic growth, were positive assets which could
feed and nurture more growth. Since the end of the Cold War, considerations that refuge
and refugeehood is and should be temporary has played an increasingly important role
justifying Chimni’s “myth of difference” and perceptions of “new refugees”120. The
emphasis on temporality necessarily rejects the exilic basis of refugeehood, and suggests
that refugees themselves want to return home as soon as possible.
For Agier, the exclusion of refugees by emphasizing the temporality of their
refuge is linked to the exceptionality of asylum, particularly in camps. The very terms
used to describe refugees suggest, “for the most part a movement that is incomplete, in
suspense, an instant and a condition that is midway between a point of departure and an
inaccessible end point, either of arrival or return. ‘Return’ itself denotes a temporary
shelter, while waiting for something better.”121 Camp settings solidify this perception by
permitting refugee-producing situations to be cast as temporary states of emergency, with
definitive beginning and end points – regardless of the evidence of long-term persecution
and of protracted displacement. For example, many Somali refugees residing in the
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Dadaab and Kakuma camps in Kenya have been displaced for twenty years, giving a
“certain duration”122 to camps, despite their purportedly exceptional, emergency nature.
As Agier states, “the humanitarian sites are supposed to be precarious spaces, always
provisional. The principle implies that the official end of a war is followed by departure
of refugees and the closure of the camp”123. If refugeehood is understood as a
fundamentally exceptional and temporary condition, as suggested by the refugee master
category and camp-centric response policies, the exclusion of refugees from host
societies becomes justifiable. That is, the principles of temporality and exceptionality
assume that displaced persons will return home as soon as possible and, upon doing so,
regain access to the protection and services of their country of nationality. Further, where
responsibility for camp-based refugees is shifted from the host state to UNHCR – such as
in Kenya – developing plans of any type loses its political importance because refugees
are considered “UNHCR’s problem.”124 Emphasizing the temporality of refugeehood by
externalizing, marginalizing and excluding refugees from access to any society absolves
asylum states of long-term responsibility for refugees, while the growing reality is, the
original cause of displacement is not being resolved in a manner which encourages
refugees to return home.
Finally, missing from the principles of separation described above are
considerations of a refugees internationally guaranteed human rights. Numerous scholars
and researchers have documented a range of human rights violations in camps. Sarah
Bailey, for example, quoting comments by United States diplomatic and consular staff,
notes that, “it is a violation of international law to deprive persons of their freedom of
movement and to confine them in conditions of hardship…”125; Guglielmo Verdirame
and Barbara Harrell-Bond argue that freedom of movement is essential to the enjoyment
of numerous other human rights126. Verdirame and Harrell-Bond go on to catalogue
human rights violations that not only occur in camps but that are part of the structural
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makeup of camps, including rights to employment and adequate standards of living127.
Such restrictions on refugees’ human rights contribute to significant frustration within
camps. Where humanitarian assistance received by refugees is more generous than
government assistance received by those residing in proximity to camps128, tension
between refugees and locals. Frustration within camps and tensions between refugees and
locals can boil over into violence and crime; for instance, Jeff Crisp documents outbreaks
of violence committed against refugees both by other refugees and local in the Dadaab
and Kakuma camps in Kenya129. These limitations on and derogations from human rights
standards may be justified on a temporary basis and in exceptional circumstances.
However, as discussed, the camp-based response regime has taken on a degree of
permanence, with many refugees residing in camps for decades with little hope of return
to their country of origin or onward movement to another destination. Hyndman and Bo
Viktor Nylund go on to ask, “at what point do civil and political, economic and social,
and cultural rights outweigh the privileges of safety…”130 This question is especially
poignant given that many camps take on a prison-like quality, turning highly vulnerable
displaced persons into prisoners or “permanent deviants”131. Refugees are literally
“locked”132 in camps in certain locations; as Jennifer Hyndman describes in the case of
the Dadaab camp in Kenya,
It is fortified with two security fences made of dry acacia bushes, which
have sharp spikes that easily puncture the skin… A large staff of guards is
stationed at the entrance gates to various sections of the compound. At
night, a number of armed guards provide extra security.133
Humanitarian intervention in the form of camps transforms into a policing function;
rather than simply acting as zones of protection for refugees, the camp functions more to
protect the host state and host society from refugees themselves.
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Hyndman and Nylund argue that camps “can provide short-term safety, but they
also institutionalize long-term exclusion, marginalization, and waste of human and
financial resources.”134 Indeed, containing refugees in effective quarantine is, as Agier
argues, “a function of the political inability to conceive their place in society as a
whole.”135 Camp-centric policies thus become a strategic tool, used in tandem with other
non-entrée policies that increasingly characterise the international refugee regime, to
meet other goals and priorities rather than attempting to address the specific – and
pressing – needs of refugees themselves. Urban refugees’ priorities, in particular, directly
conflict with the aforementioned strategic goals.

4.4 The Urban Refugee Challenge

Despite the efforts of dominant states to condition refugee behaviour to achieve the goals
of externalization, marginalization, and social exclusion, significant numbers of refugees
cannot or will not conform to the refugee construct. During the height of the camp-centric
refugee regime, the proportion of refugees residing in urban areas was low –
approximately one percent in 1996136. Since then, the proportion of refugees residing in
urban areas has increased dramatically, reaching approximately twenty-seven percent in
2007137. This increase can be attributed to a number of factors. The urban area option
might be evaluated as “less bad” than the camp asylum one – either through hearsay or
previous experience. For example, having resided in a camp, refugees may choose to flee
a second time in order to improve their living conditions. Or, having sought refuge in a
camp for the duration of a particular conflict, the camp may have closed, leaving refugees
to either return home or seek refuge elsewhere. Whatever the reason, the relevant fact is
urban self-settlement is on the rise without a concomitant following of resources to
reduce the suffering experienced from an identifiable crisis. It is this gap in protection
that is most glaring when set against the general policy and practice which requires a
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refugee to be conceptually defined, in part, in terms of where they can be contained and
counted.
Giorgio Agamben argues that refugees challenge the concepts of the “nationstate” and the “rights of man”, urban refugees challenge the concept of refugeehood – by
exposing the limitations of the refugee master category’s usefulness in structuring the
international refugee regime. Urban refugees pose a clear challenge to the “ideal” refugee
defined by the refugee master category. They do not necessarily flee in large groups, but
instead may be an individual or a single family. They are not necessarily fleeing
exceptional circumstances, but rather, as Agamben suggests, a series of persecutory
actions that cause an irreparable break between citizen and state. Consequently, their
flight is not necessarily temporary; rather, they may seek a permanent home where they
can rebuild their lives and recover from the trauma experienced in their country of origin.
This latter point may be the most significant challenge that urban refugees pose to
the refugee master category, and by extension to the strategic goals of dominant states vis
a vis the international refugee regime. Despite widespread discourse on burden-sharing
within the international refugee regime, the priority of dominant, Western governments is
more akin to burden-shifting, in that integration in neighbouring countries is, for Western
governments, the “cornerstone of national and international refugee policies by which
permanent solutions are sought…”138 – to the chagrin of developing states into which
refugees are to be integrated. Rather than residing in marginal areas apart from society,
urban refugees seek to locate themselves in the heart of their host society. While their
motivations vary, the desire the build a new life, characterised by integration into the host
society, is a recurrent theme.
According to Gaim Kibreab, integration is:
an economic, social and cultural process by which refugees become
members of the host society on a permanent basis irrespective of how
things develop in their countries of origin. Refugees are accepted on a
permanent basis. This is followed by legal integration whereby the
refugees concerned acquire the citizenship of the country of their asylum
through naturalization.139
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Kibreab’s definition of integration is set forth here due to both its emphasis on the
potential permanence of refugeehood, and its separation of integration from the
naturalization process. While legal integration through naturalization is an important step
in establishing the legal validity of a refugees’ integration into the host society, it cannot
be does not necessarily need to be the only indicator of integration, particularly given the
numerous obstacles both host and resettlement states place on the attainment of
citizenship by refugees. Though integration is a somewhat subjective concept, with a
variety of meanings depending on the particular context, it can be understood to
encompass economic integration actualized by employment, and social integration
actualized by cultivating social networks and accessing social services with legal
integration actualized through naturalization as the highest achieved outcome.
Although flight from persecution is a key characteristic of refugeehood according
to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol, it is not necessarily the only
factor pushing individuals and families to flee. As increasing discussion of mixed
migration suggests, and scholars such as Roger Zetter and Alexander Betts affirm, the
refugee label is no longer a discreet category that can easily capture the displacement
experiences of all who fall within the realm of such experiences. In many cases, the
inability to build a sustainable economic livelihood as a result of systematic
discrimination or to be surrounded by adequate protection resources can contribute to
displacement and flight. Evidence suggests that when a refugee or family of refugees is
burdened by economic instability in the country of asylum, it is unlikely that they will be
able to fully recover from the trauma of their displacement. Being caught in economic
limbo exacerbates the perception of being stuck in a state of flux, unable to return home
and, in most cases, unable to seek refuge elsewhere. It is therefore unsurprising that
refugees place significant importance on economic integration in the host society. For
example, research on refugees in Cairo shows that, despite significant protection
concerns and rampant discrimination, integration through employment leading to
financial self-sufficiency is the primary concern140.
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Opportunities for economic integration play an important role for many refugees
in determining where to see refuge, where such choices are available. Karen Jacobsen
argues that a relatively small portion of refugees actually choose to live in camps, and
those that do not often believe that the economic opportunities offered by urban
settlement outweigh the potential legal instability of urban residence, even when their
residence contravenes camp confinement policies141. Urban settings offer greater
opportunities for economic integration than camps, where refugees are generally reduced
to victims and passive recipients of humanitarian aid142. By seeking economic integration
through employment, urban refugees seek the stability that will allow them to overcome
their trauma and rebuild their lives. However, in doing so – and in tandem with the
increasing incidence of protracted displacement – their refuge becomes a more permanent
condition, rather than the exceptional, temporary condition, suggested by dominant states
through the refugee master category and reflected in camp-centric refugee policies.
By seeking refuge in urban settings, refugees are also seeking stability through
social integration, such as cultivating informal networks and accessing social services.
Large urban centres in developing states, such as Nairobi, Cairo, Johannesburg, Kampala,
Bangkok, and others, host significant refugee populations, creating social networks that
newcomers can access. Newcomers can seek housing, financial and material assistance,
and information about social service organizations through networks of refugees already
settled in host cities143. Similarly, many refugees believe that they will have greater
access to social services, such as health care and education, in urban centres. However,
social services are often shared with citizens, stretching the limited resources of host
states, which is of particular concern to developing states which lack the resources to
provide social services to citizens. For example, as discussed in the following chapter,
many of the reservations expressed by Egypt to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967
Refugee Protocol relate to social services such as education, public relief, and social
security, on the basis that, as a developing country, Egypt was not in a position to provide
such services for refugees. Competition for social resources causes tension between host
141
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state societies and refugees, leading host states to seek to prevent social integration.144.
However, once urban refugees have gained access to social networks and services
through social integration, they regain a degree of agency that was lost during flight.
Rather than remaining passive recipients of humanitarian aid, they are able to regain a
degree of self-sufficiency and reassert some of their independence. In Cairo, for example,
many NGOs assisting refugees rely heavily on social networks within refugee
communities to publicize their services and reach clients145. In extreme cases, being able
to access legal aid organizations and other advocacy networks may discourage host
governments from detaining, expelling or refouling urban refugees, whereas refugees
residing in camp settings remain “the most distant, the least visible and the least
integrated”146 and, due to this invisibility, vulnerable to the whims of the state “that keeps
the power to control and abandon [them].”147 From the refugees’ perspective social
integration may make expulsion from an urban area less likely due to both the logistical
challenges of locating refugees among large urban populations, and the ethical sensitivity
of undertaking expulsion from within a highly visible urban environment. The social
service organizations and NGOs that refugees seek to access by moving to urban areas
can, in this case, perform a dual function – first, providing direct assistance to refugees,
and second, monitoring and raising awareness about government practices toward
refugees. When these considerations are accounted for, it is clear why economic and
social integration are so highly valued by refugees, in terms of the role integration plays
in personal recovery and the resources that can be attained through integration.
At the root of their desire for integration is the aspiration to find a permanent
solution to their situation. Displacement causes significant disruption, and, faced with an
international policy regime that emphasizes the temporality of refugeehood writ large
and the temporality of their refuge in particular, re-establishing a stable and sustainable
life takes on greater importance. In camps, Agier suggests, “nothing can ever be totally
achieved… the incompleteness of the integration process is co-substantial to them,
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quarantine being their very horizon.”148 However, seeking permanent solutions in the
host state runs contrary to one of the key assumptions underlying Chimni’s “myth of
difference”: that refugees want to return to their country of origin as soon as possible149.
Agier illustrates the significance of the “myth of difference” using the example of an
applicant for resettlement in the US:
… a young Somalian, Mohammed, a second-year student of medicine
when he fled Mogadishu, tells how he passed an “oral test” for possible
resettlement in the United States and everything was going well, until he
“tripped up” on a single question. When he was asked if he wanted to
return eventually to Africa, he answered with a sincere and enthusiastic
“no”, understanding only too late that his examiners would rather have
heard “yes” as a proof of attachment to his original identity.150
Agier’s example suggests that, although the candidate was being interviewed for
theoretically permanent resettlement, the belief that refugees should want to return to
their home state – and by extension, the belief in the temporality of refugeehood – is so
deeply embedded into understandings of refugeehood that it holds influence despite the
implied permanence of resettlement. Interestingly, in this case a lack of attachment to the
home state and identity poses a barrier to acceptance by the resettlement state, in contrast
to more common assertions that too much attachment to the home state and identity can
pose barriers to integration into host or resettlement societies.
Through their behaviour, urban refugees suggest that seeking refuge is not
necessarily an exceptional or temporary condition, but rather a road to permanent
settlement and integration. Similarly, by seeking integration, urban refugees express their
opposition to the strategies of externalization and marginalization – or “distancing of
undesirables”151 – pursued by dominant states through the international refugee regime.
Rather than accepting camp-based solutions, where, as Agier suggests,
“humanitarianism… becomes a second-best to integration for all those who, for various
reasons, we do not want to integrate into the social and political world of human beings,
keeping them instead in vague waiting-rooms, on the margins of the world…”152, urban
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refugees challenge the refugee master category by seeking permanent settlement in the
spatial heartland of host states.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter argues that urban refugees challenge the refugee management strategies
pursued by dominant states – externalization, marginalization and exclusion. Dominant
states use the refugee master category, which assumes refugeehood is a collective,
exceptional, and temporary condition, to rationalize these strategies, leading them to
pursue camp-centric refugee response policies. In contrast, urban refugees seek to settle
in the conceptual and spatial heartland of host states and pursue economic and social
integration in host societies. Economic and social integration represent opportunities to
recover from the trauma of flight, re-establish stable livelihoods, and regain the
independence lost during displacement. By avoiding camps and intentionally seeking
integration, urban refugees disrupt the principles of the refugee master category which
are increasingly transforming refugeehood into a permanent condition. This disruption
makes it difficult for dominant states to uphold the strategic priorities enshrined in camp
centric policies. Further, as will be discussed in the following chapter, host states also
place significant restrictions on refugees’ access to economic and social integration,
leaving significant gaps in protection and services unaddressed. By withholding access,
host states attempt to condition all refugees’ behaviour to conform to the refugee master
category. Neither party has shown a willingness to acknowledge that the refugee master
category is inapplicable to many contemporary displacement crises and that there is a
pressing need to re-evaluate the refugee concept in light of the contemporary
displacement experiences generally and the increasing urbanity of refugeehood in
particular.
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Chapter 5: PROTECTION GAPS FACING URBAN REFUGEES – EGYPT AND
LEBANON

In contrast to camp settings, urban areas offer opportunities for economic and social
independence. While camp settings effectively require refugees to give up a variety of
human rights, such as freedom of movement, in exchange for humanitarian assistance,
urban settlement allows refugees opportunities to lay claim to their rights while they seek
their own economic and social livelihoods. By constructing camp-settled refugees as
passive victims whose primary function is to be the recipient of humanitarian aid, campbased refugee policies strip refugees of individual agency and exacerbate power
imbalances between refugees, states, and “humanitarian government”.153 These power
imbalances prevent refugees from resisting policies implemented upon them in an
organized manner. Camp-based policies further embed the temporality and exceptionality
of refugeehood, and facilitate the exclusion of refugees from host societies. Michel Agier
describes camp-settled refugees as “people waiting apart from society”154; however,
significant numbers of refugees are no longer content to wait. Despite what UNHCR
describes as the “iconic image” of refugees – “row upon row of white tents in a sprawling
emergency camps” – over half of refugees assisted by UNHCR reside in urban areas155.
Refugees seek shelter in urban areas to gain access to medical services, educational
opportunities for children, humanitarian aid, or even resettlement. Perhaps the most
significant feature of refugee urbanization is the challenge to the dominant assumption
that refugees want to return home. Seeking refuge in urban areas represents for many the
opportunity to leave behind the trauma of their flight and build a new life.
The objective of this chapter is to understand the specific protection gaps
affecting urban refugees in Egypt and Lebanon, as indicative of protection gaps affecting
urban refugees in the Middle East and North Africa region and elsewhere. Despite
differences in the legal and policy frameworks between Egypt and Lebanon, the service
gaps affecting urban refugees are strikingly similar. The most compelling observation
arising from this inter-country comparison is the underlying rationale: fear that, in
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granting urban refugees full access to rights and services, refugees would settle
permanently in host states and integrate into host societies. Withholding protection and
services is a simple means to discourage refugees from permanent settlement and to
reinforce the temporary nature of refuge and refugeehood.
Although there are many protection gaps documented in the literature and
discussions regarding refugees, the purpose of this chapter is to highlight protection gaps
that most frequently and most deeply impact the ability of urban refugees to establish and
sustain their livelihoods. Shortfalls have been grouped into three categories: gaps in legal
status; gaps in economic capacity; and gaps in social services. Legal status gaps relate to
the legal recognition given to refuges and whether this recognition offers protection from
arbitrary arrest and deportation. Economic capacity gaps concern whether refugees are
granted the right to work, and whether substantial administrative obstacles prevent them
from actualizing this right. The ability to earn an income is a prerequisite for obtaining
other key livelihood resources, including food, housing, and medical attention. Social
services may attempt to address some of these gaps, but reliance on charity is
fundamentally unsustainable over the long term. Finally, social service gaps relate to the
availability and accessibility of services including education and health care, which are
indicative of the potential for the integration of urban refugees into host societies.
Although the following case studies are intended to illustrate protection gaps
facing urban refugees throughout the Middle East – and other developing regions – the
extent of the gaps is not solely the blame of these host countries. While host states have a
clear responsibility for protecting refugees – particularly those which, like Egypt, are
signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol – many of the
expected protections and services have a significant financial impact. Given that most
refugees are hosted in the developing world, where states often face challenges providing
for their own citizens, there is a clear role for the international community to assist in the
provision of protection and services. As Karen Jacobsen notes, “what does it mean for the
international community to say that refugees have rights, but do nothing to ensure that
they enjoy them?”156
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5.1 Seeking Asylum in Middle Eastern States

Prior to examining protection gaps facing urban refugees in Egypt and Lebanon, it is
helpful to describe the legal environment within which urban refugees are offered
protection. The legal status of refugees in the Middle East has varied over time and
between states, depending on both domestic and regional political dynamics. Only four
states – Egypt, Israel, Yemen, and Iran – are parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention and
1967 Refugee Protocol, and of these, only Israel has adopted domestic refugee
legislation. Middle Eastern states have largely relied on the UNHCR to deal with
refugees on their behalf.
The events of September 11, 2001, deepened hostility towards refugees in the
Middle East. Discourse surrounding refugees, particularly refugees from the Middle East
and North Africa, has increasingly centered on the potential security risk refugees may
pose to host countries. The securitization of asylum-seeking has created significant
obstacles to improving the treatment of refugees both in the Middle East and around the
world. Securitization has also given Middle Eastern governments a “free pass” to
persecute refugees for the sake of “protecting security”157. Despite this discouraging
trend, refugee rights remain on the agenda for Middle Eastern governments. In 2003, the
OIC Islamic Summit passed a resolution on “Problems of Refugees in the Muslim
World”, which called for greater co-operation with UNHCR and for those states not party
to the Refugee Convention to work toward accession. In 2004, the Arab League affirmed
support for the right to seek asylum outlined in Article 28 of the Arab Charter on Human
Rights. Yet despite these declarations, no new refugee legislation has been adopted by
Middle Eastern governments and no additional Middle Eastern states have signed on to
either the Refugee Convention or Refugee Protocol. Global security remains a higher
priority and increasingly provides the framework through which refugee issues are
addressed.
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Despite differences in legal and policy frameworks for implementing refugee
protection in Egypt and Lebanon, the experiences of urban refugees in each state
illuminate protection gaps facing urban refugees both in the Middle East and in the
developing world at large. Though legal and policy frameworks influence the experiences
of urban refugees, there are great similarities between protection gaps in Egypt and
Lebanon. It is these parallels that permit comparison between the case studies that follow.

5.2 Egypt

Egypt is home to a significant number of refugees and asylum-seekers. Official estimates
suggest that 114,000 refugees and asylum-seekers reside in Egypt, excluding
approximately 50,000 Syrian refugees and asylum-seekers, although unofficial estimates
range up to 500,000158. Thirty five nationalities have been documented, including sizable
Sudanese, Iraqi, Eritrean, Somali and Ethiopian populations. The vast majority of
refugees in Egypt reside in Cairo, with a smaller number residing in Alexandria. Though
Egypt has been described as generally “tolerant”159 of refugees within its borders, they
nonetheless face numerous legal and socio-economic barriers to achieving stability and
rebuilding their livelihoods.

5.2.1 Legal Protection Gaps

Egypt is a signatory to both the Refugee Convention and Protocol, and to the 1969
Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa (OAU Convention). An individual may be recognized as a refugee
under either – or both – conventions. In theory, the availability of two protocols expands
protection space for refugees, by broadening the definitions used to qualify a displaced
person. For example, in addition to the basic refugee definition articulated in the Refugee
Convention and Protocol, which focusses on individualized persecution for reasons of
158
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race, nationality, religion, political opinion, or social group, the OAU Convention
provides for the recognition of persons who are fleeing generalized violence or
aggression by a foreign power. Given the prevalence of ongoing conflicts in the countries
of origin for most refugees in Cairo – Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Iraq – the
OAU Convention significantly enhances opportunities for protection. Sadly, in practice,
it does not appear that dual protection regimes translate into better protection or
assistance for refugees.
Prior to ratifying the conventions, the Egyptian government expressed
reservations to a number of provisions, including articles providing for elementary
education, public relief, the right to work, social security and personal status, effectively
exempting itself from otherwise internationally accepted expectations of providing basic
socio-economic rights to refugees. Most significantly, the government reserved the right
to regulate the entry of refugees into the labour force by issuing work permits160. The
effect of this reservation will be discussed further below; here, it suffices to say that
Egypt’s reservation to the right to work is the single biggest impediment to refugees’
ability to establish and maintain stable livelihoods and by extension to remove
themselves from requiring ongoing state aid.
Recognition of refugee status in Egypt offers little legal protection; as Katarzyna
Grabska notes, “due to their unstable legal status and the often hostile attitude of the local
population, many refugees constantly fear arrest and harassment.”161 Random arrests,
arbitrary detention and police harassment are particularly prevalent within refugee
communities originating from Africa, although Iraqi refugees have reported similar
abuse. A shared religious identity does not seem to reduce hostility from the Egyptian
community or being a target for state harassment162. In illustrating an ongoing protection
crisis facing refugees in Cairo, Michael Kagan describes increased incidences of
refoulement and prolonged and arbitrary detention over the past five years163. The
vulnerability of refugees to harassment by legal authorities is exacerbated by a lack of
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awareness among front-line law enforcement officers about UNHCR identification
documents and by UNHCR’s inability to successfully intervene in legal or national
security matters on behalf of refugees164. Despite confirmed recognition of their status by
the Egyptian government, refugees in Cairo continue to face a significant absence of legal
protection.

5.2.2 Economic Protection Gaps

As noted above, while acceding to the Refugee Convention and Protocol, Egypt entered
reservations regarding the right of refugees to obtain employment, presumably to protect
its national labour force, which already faces high rates of unemployment. To be clear,
refugees are not expressly denied the right to work; however, in order to obtain formal,
legal employment, refugees must obtain individual work permits which impose
significant administrative burdens on both refugees and potential employers. Employers
must meet labour market tests, including proving that the national labour force is unable
to meet job requirements, as well as paying fees to sponsor refugees to obtain work
permits.
As a result of these obstacles, most refugees – not unlike many Egyptian citizens
– must rely on employment in the informal economy. A survey conducted among Iraqi
refugees in Cairo, arguably the most well-educated and highly qualified refugee
population in the city, showed that only twenty-two percent has obtained either formal or
informal employment165. Studies of Sudanese refugees suggest that most work
“sporadically, with no job security, and often under exploitative conditions”166.
Employment rates vary between refugee groups, as well as within refugee communities;
for example, female refugees are somewhat more likely to obtain work as domestic aides,
which offers a degree of income stability, while male refugees typically rely on
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employment as day labourers167. What emerges is a clear trend toward reliance on
informal employment to support refugee livelihoods in Cairo. Unfortunately,
participation in the informal economy has significant drawbacks, leaving refugees
vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.
Lack of economic resources impacts virtually all aspects of refugee livelihoods in
Cairo, particularly the ability to secure housing. Stefan Sperl argues that the “true
predicament” of refugees in Cairo is an uneven income to expenditure ratio168. While the
cost of living for refugees rises significantly from year to year, the ability to earn a
consistent wage to cover living costs does not improve in tandem. Where Egyptian
nationals are able to access rent controlled housing, refugees are left to compete for
housing in private rental markets with other foreigners, where rental prices are much
higher and subject to arbitrary increases. As a result, refugees are forced into overcrowded housing arrangements with poor sanitation and little personal security169. Where
housing in metropolitan Cairo is unobtainable, many must reside in shantytowns in fringe
areas, where “a windowless room in a dwelling under construction costs some $18US per
month”170. In the absence of secure employment, many refugees rely heavily on
allowances from UNHCR and Caritas, which cover less than one-third of household
costs. Furthermore the allowances have been reduced by an average of seventy-two
percent in keeping with UNHCR’s shift from “care and maintenance” to “self-reliance”
in dealing with refugees in urban areas171. Egypt’s reservation to the right to work for
refugees , while understandable in the context of its own workforce, has the effect of
exacerbating desperation and potentially creating social unrest among refugees as a result
of extended impoverishment.
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5.2.3 Social Service Protection Gaps

Social services for refugees are similarly uncertain. A 1954 Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between Egypt and UNHCR formalized UNHCR’s significant
role in determining refugee status and providing social services for refugees and asylum
seekers. The MOU articulated UNHCR responsibility for registration, education, health
care, and social welfare services. To address the needs of refugees, UNHCR works with
partner agencies and NGOs, including CARITAS, AMERA, CRS, Refuge Egypt, the
Egyptian Red Crescent, and Islamic Relief Worldwide, as well as numerous community
and faith based organizations. While it has been argued that the creation of a social
services network separate from social services provided to Egyptian nationals may
contribute to divisions within Egyptian society and the growth of xenophobia, it is clear
that without the social services provided by UNHCR and its implementing partners,
refugees and asylum-seekers would be significantly worse off.
Since 2005, refugees in Cairo have been eligible for primary health care services
at government health institutions. However, after accessing medical attention at public
hospitals and clinics, refugees report concerns about the quality of care, discrimination
and racism among doctors, and fears of intentional malpractice, up to and including organ
theft172. Secondary health care services are primarily provided by Caritas, which works
with medical service providers and specialists as needed through a referral system. The
cost of treatment is then split between the individual refugee, who typically pays for
thirty to fifty percent of the cost, and Caritas, which is reimbursed by UNHCR173. While
cost-sharing appears reasonable, it is largely unaffordable for the majority of refugees in
light of the broader economic context facing refugees in Cairo, particularly their inability
to obtain formal employment. Work in the informal economy provides cash wages which
are barely sufficient to cover food or rent, let alone medical expenses, even at a reduced
rate174. In cases where medical treatment is expensive – for example, surgical procedures
– Caritas may decline to assist with even partial funding. Where medical treatment
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requires speciality attention not available in Egypt, refugees have been advised to seek
resettlement175. Altogether, despite the presence of an institutional framework intended to
assist urban refugees obtain medical attention, refugees themselves feel chronically
underserved in this area. One survey conducted among refugees in Cairo indicated that
additional assistance in accessing health care was desired above all other forms of
assistance176.
Access to education for refugee children in Cairo is another significant concern.
In general, with the exception of Sudanese children, refugee children have limited access
to public education. However, even Sudanese children often fall victim to administrative
obstacles and discrimination; Grabska notes that, “although officially Sudanese refugee
children with valid residence permits have the right to public education, bureaucratic
procedures, overcrowded schools and racial discrimination often experienced by pupils
make access to government schools impossible.”177 As a result, most families, resort to
sending their children to schools run by faith-based organizations; even there refugees are
often limited by sectarian restrictions on enrollment178. Finally, these alternative schools
are not accredited by the government, resulting in graduating students being ineligible to
take state examinations required to earn a diploma which would qualify them for access
to further educational opportunities179.
Taken together, social service gaps compound legal and economic protection
gaps, rendering integration into life in Cairo extremely difficult. As a result the majority
of refugees in Cairo live a precarious existence, caught in a semi-permanent limbo
between their inability to return or to move elsewhere. By leaving barriers to integration
unaddressed, characteristics assumed to be present under the refugee master category –
specifically temporality and exceptionality– are embedded into refugee policies, the
attitudes of the general public, and hence the daily lives of refugees. By casting
refugeehood as a temporary and exceptional condition – despite the presence of refugees
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who have resided in Cairo for decades – the Egyptian government, and by extension the
international community justify behaviour whose main purpose is to exclude and
marginalize more than it is to protect and assist refugees.

5.3 Lebanon

In contrast to Egypt, Lebanon hosts a significantly smaller and more heterogeneous
refugee population180. In January 2012, approximately 10,000 refugees and asylumseekers were registered with UNHCR’s Regional Office in Beirut (RO Beirut), excluding
Syrians displaced into northern Lebanon due to the ongoing conflict in Syria. The
majority of Syrians hosted in Lebanon are housed in camps outside Beirut. As the focus
here is on urban refugees in Beirut, protection gaps facing those in camps will not be
discussed. At present the most numerically significant refugee population in Lebanon
continues to be Iraqis, who compose over eighty percent of refugees registered with RO
Beirut. ,t is estimated that the number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR is
approximately one-fifth of the total population of Iraqis residing in Lebanon181; however,
for various reasons, the vast majority chose not to register with RO Beirut, and as such
the population of Iraqi refugees residing in Lebanon is likely larger. Smaller communities
from other countries, such as Somalia and Sudan, also reside in Beirut. In spite of a much
smaller refugee “problem”, the Lebanese government expresses “less tolerance and a
high level of rejection” towards refugees, exacerbating protection gaps facing refugees
within its jurisdiction182.
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5.3.1 Legal Protection Gaps

Unlike Egypt, Lebanon is not a signatory to either the Refugee Convention or Protocol.
While refugees entering Lebanon are registered and provided identification by UNHCR,
this identification is largely ignored by Lebanese authorities except to the extent that
those who have such identification can apply for short term residence permits. These
permits must by necessity be frequently renewed and can be administratively difficult and
expensive to obtain – if they are renewed at all. If, for instance, Lebanese authorities
determined that refugees should be encouraged to leave the country, they would simply
deny residence permits forcing them to leave or remain illegally. Individual refugees
have little recourse, although UNHCR has, on occasion, intervened to legalize the
residence of refugees in Lebanon. Because of the difficulties in obtaining and renewing
residence permits, most refugees in Lebanon – particularly Iraqi refugees – reside in the
country illegally. One survey conducted among Iraqi refugees in Beirut found that almost
eighty percent entered Lebanon illegally183. While some are able to regularize their status,
many more lapse – or relapse – into illegality if and when they are unable to renew their
residence permits. As a result, refugees in Lebanon are extremely vulnerable to arbitrary
arrest, detention, and expulsion. According to UNHCR, detention of refugees in Lebanon
is significantly higher than in neighbouring states184. Although in 2008 UNHCR was able
to intervene with Lebanese authorities to regularize the status of approximately 600
detained refugees185, the vast majority live in fear of arrest and detention.
A lack of legal status has further psychosocial impacts that impair the ability of
refugees to rebuild and sustain their lives. The constant fear of being discovered prevents
many refugees from accessing health care or other social services186, and causes refugees
to congregate on the fringes of Lebanese society, avoiding contact with locals, and
physically, in suburbs of Beirut187. Similarly, because refugees have a lack of legal
recourse to address unfair treatment, many find themselves taken advantage of by
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exploitative employers and landlords188. Refugees strive to “endure a permanently low
profile” to avoid detection189. On the other hand, their inability to access the formal
labour market pushes many refugees into criminal economic activities such as
prostitution or human smuggling, reinforcing the association between illegal residency
status and criminal behaviour among both the Lebanese public and government
authorities190. Economic and social service protection gaps, discussed further below, are
thus closely related to legal protection gaps facing urban refugees in Lebanon.

5.3.2 Economic Protection Gaps

As in Cairo, refugees in Beirut lack the right to obtain formal, legal employment without
obtaining work permits. As in Cairo, these can be administratively difficult and expensive
to obtain so that again, the vast majority of refugees in Lebanon rely on informal
employment, which exposes them to abuse and exploitation in both wages and working
conditions. However, due to their uncertain legal status, refugees working informally in
Beirut are arguably more vulnerable to exploitation, because they must trust that their
employer will not turn them over to the authorities. Knowing that refugees have no legal
recourse, employers have been known to take advantage of refugee workers191.
Where refugees in Beirut are unable to find employment in the informal economy,
studies have documented a turn to criminal activities. Refugee women become involved
in prostitution, while refugee men – particularly young men – become involved in human
smuggling, drawing in many cases, upon networks forged during their own initial, often
illegal, transit192. These patterns of exploitation are particularly troubling due to increased
youth involvement in the workforce among refugees in Lebanon. Believing that children
and youth are less likely to be arrested and detained due to their irregular legal status,
families frequently chose to send youth to obtain employment and support their
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families193. Putting aside the impacts on education and development of refugee youth, the
participation of youth in the workforce – particularly in criminal activities such as
prostitution and human smuggling – exacerbates the myriad social vulnerabilities of
refugees in Beirut, not to mention the impact of these activities on the rest of Lebanese
society and the need for additional government policing resources.
The high cost of living in Beirut further impacts the unstable economic situation
of refugees in the city. While refugees in Egypt are subject to higher rent prices than
nationals, the overall cost of living excluding housing is fairly low. Lebanon, on the other
hand, is considered a middle income country, and the overall cost of living is reflective of
this status. In terms of housing, in particular, landlords have been known to exploit the
irregular status of refugees, knowing that they have no legal recourse to unfair treatment.
Finally, there is a high degree of privatization of “public” services in Lebanon, including
health care and education, the cost of which further stretch the limited financial resources
of refugees.

5.3.3 Social Service Protection Gaps

Because Lebanon is not a signatory to either the Refugee Convention or Protocol, the
government accepts no responsibility for providing social services for refugees within its
borders. In its stead, UNHCR and community and faith-based organizations – including
Caritas, the AMEL Association, RESTART, the Lebanese High Relief Commission, the
Danish Refugee Council, the Makhazoumi Foundation, and Association Justice et
Misericorde – offer social services to allow refugees to meet their immediate livelihood
needs.
However, as is the case in Egypt, many basic and fundamental social services are
controlled by the government. For example, though a significant number of refugees
indicate that they suffer from acute and chronic illnesses, such as diabetes and
hypertension, they are reluctant or unable to seek medical treatment at government health
facilities for fear of being exposed as illegal residents. When accessing the public health
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care system, refugees are further confronted with a system that suffers from chronic
underfunding and endemic overcrowding194. One of the most significant differences
between Egypt and Lebanon is the extent of privatization in tertiary social services. For
example, while basic emergency medical care may be available through state-run
institutions, specialist care is outsourced to private care providers. This privatization
significantly increases the cost of treatment, often beyond refugees’ means. Combined
with a deep-seated fear of exposure, many refugees simply chose to suffer in silence.
Access to education in Lebanon, on the surface, is the one potential ray of hope.
In 2008, the Lebanese Ministry of Education issued a circular calling on both public and
private schools to facilitate the registration of refugee children, and UNHCR provides
school supplies and grants to cover tuition fees. The positive impact of this decision is
debatable. UNHCR states that approximately eighty percent of refugee children between
the ages of four and seventeen are enrolled in either primary or secondary school, while
an independent study of Iraqi refugee children, the largest quotient of refugee children
living in Beirut, suggested that less than sixty percent of Iraqi refugee children between
the ages of six and seventeen actually attend school195. This discrepancy is due to several
factors, including differences in curricula between Lebanon and Iraq, second language
requirements in Lebanon, and overcrowding in schools196. As noted above, because many
children are taken out of school to work, the drop-out rate among refugee children is
high197; UNHCR has noted that school enrollment is one of the most pressing issues
facing the refugee community in Beirut. Therefore, although UNHCR has made progress
in promoting and facilitating the entry of refugee children into the Lebanese educational
system, their efforts have been virtually negated by the challenging economic situation
facing refugee families. As in Egypt, the social, economic and legal protection gaps that
structure refugee lives in Lebanon are inextricably intertwined, making it difficult for
urban refugees in Beirut to establish sustainable livelihoods.
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5.4 Trends in Protection Gaps

Despite significant differences in the legislative and policy environments structuring
urban refugee experiences in Cairo and Beirut, a number of common protection gaps
emerge. Although refugees in Cairo benefit from the recognition of refugee status, they
receive little more protection than those in Beirut – both face arbitrary arrest and
detention. Urban refugees in both countries are effectively excluded from the formal
economy, leaving them vulnerable to exploitative wages and working conditions,
severely impacting their ability to secure stable housing. Access to health care is impeded
by a lack of financial resources, and by a degree of fear – in Egypt, related to
discrimination and intentional malpractice by doctors, and in Lebanon, related to the
potential of exposing illegal residency. Both countries have made attempts to address the
education of refugee children by implementing policies to allow refugees access to public
and private educational systems; yet in practice, refugee children face significant
challenges in accessing education. These protection gaps are indicative of challenges
facing urban refugees throughout the Middle East, and in other developing states.
UNHCR staff frequently note that assisting geographically dispersed refugee populations
entails a host of obstacles not present when dealing with a “captive audience” in camp
settings198.
The most compelling trend arising in Egypt and Lebanon is the relationship
between protection gaps and the inability of urban refugees to integrate into their host
community. Despite UNHCR’s advocacy of a policy of “self-reliance” among urban
refugees, state policies – or the lack thereof – appear to undermine the ability of refugees
to attain a sustainable livelihood. While UNHCR seeks to effectively wean refugees away
from institutional assistance, state policies work to make refugees more dependent on aid.
For example, the denial of the right to work in both Egypt and Lebanon prevents refugees
from earning a stable income and benefiting from labour protection laws, leaving them
vulnerable to exploitation and abuse and impairing their ability to sustain themselves and
their families in the long term. Despite the frequently articulated rationale of the necessity
of protecting the ability of domestic populations’ access to limited state resources, there
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is also a discernible fear that closing protection gaps – for instance, by granting refugees
the right to work – will result in refugees choosing to permanently settle in host states.
This alternative is unacceptable to the vast majority of host states, including Egypt and
Lebanon, which see themselves as temporary hosts; Egypt, in particular, has explicitly
denied that local integration is an option for those seeking refuge within its territory.
Integration runs contrary to the characteristics assumed by the refugee master category,
as it implies permanence and normalization of refugeehood, and subverts the strategic
priorities of both host states in the developing world and Western states. Refugees who
are legally, economically, and socially integrated cannot be excluded, marginalized, or
externalized, and host states are harder pressed to reduce their responsibilities toward
refugees.
The existence of protection gaps is therefore rooted not only in state self-interest
and operational challenges, but also in a belief in the exceptionality and temporality of
refugeehood. Exceptionality and temporality have long been fundamental pillars of
refugeehood. From the outset, refugeehood was conceived as temporary, surrogate
protection that came into effect under exceptional circumstances, while an individual’s
country of nationality would not or could not protect them. Refugeehood was never
imagined to be a permanent – or even long-term – condition. However, the increased
incidence of protected refugee situations, particularly since the end of the Cold War, has
challenged the pillars of exceptionality and temporality. Unwilling to acknowledge the
erosion of these principles, many host states in both the developed and developing world
cling to the exceptionality and temporality of refugeehood in the hope that doing so will
exonerate them from long-term responsibility for refugees within their jurisdiction.
Integration suggests a degree of permanence, as refugees replace the ties severed with
their country of origin with ties forged with their host state and society. Urban refugees
explode the notions of exceptionality and temporality, as unlike camp refugees, they
cannot be sequestered from the local population in a sustained state of emergency.
In both Egypt and Lebanon, the possibility of integration is severely curtailed by
the denial of access to core livelihood assets – security from arbitrary arrest and
detention, legal employment, and access to social services. This attitude can be partially
attributed to a fear of “Palestinization” of refugees living in Egypt and Lebanon, or the
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facilitation of long-term settlement of refugees in host states199. This temporality or “inbetweenness” is completely institutionalized in Lebanon, where Iraqi refugees are
removed from the international refugee regime altogether, due to Lebanon’s nonrecognition of refugee status. While Lebanon may provide temporary residence permits
to urban “refugees”, this only exacerbates a “feeling of transitory residence”, highlighting
the incompleteness of flight from the horrors of home to a “dream destination” that has
not yet been reached200. Urban refugees are stranded between a lack of long-term
alternatives in the host state and, increasingly, an inability to return home due to the
protracted nature of conflicts in countries of origin. The shrinking number of resettlement
spaces available suggests parallel attitudes among developed states201. If the preservation
of exceptionality and temporality is understood as essential to the international refugee
regime, the persistence of protection gaps can be interpreted as serving a strategic
function in upholding the foundations of refugeehood.
The insistence on the exceptionality and temporality of refugeehood, particularly
in urban settings, is further highlighted in the inability of refugees in either Egypt or
Lebanon to become naturalized. Naturalization, while not the sole indicator of permanent
integration, is frequently cited as a key step in the process. Article 1C(3) of the Refugee
Convention states that refugee status ceases to apply when an individual acquires a new
nationality and enjoys the protection of their new country of nationality, a process which
occurs through naturalization. Once naturalized, a refugee gains all rights and privileges
granted to a citizen of the state, and ceases to require the protection of the surrogate
refugee regime. However, in both Egypt and Lebanon, naturalization is denied to
refugees, regardless of the length of their residency in either country or of their social or
economic integration into national communities. This denial “exacerbates the feeling of
transitory residence”202, reinforcing the exclusion of refugees from the national
community, legally, economically and socially.
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5.5 Conclusion

A desire to prevent permanent integration of urban refugees leads both Egyptian and
Lebanese authorities to leave glaring legal, economic and social service protection gaps
unaddressed. In both states, refugees face significant obstacles accessing a key economic
need – the right to work. Although Egypt offers greater legal protection than Lebanon
due to its accession to the Refugee Convention and Protocol, in practice urban refugees in
both states are vulnerable to arbitrary arrest and detention. In spite of the reality of long
term displacement, a continuing environment of insecurity and instability prevents
refugees from rebuilding their lives and becoming productive consumers and citizens in
their host state.
Fundamentally, protection gaps which prevent integration, such as those facing
urban refugees in Cairo and Beirut reinforce the characteristics assumed by the refugee
master category. The refugee master category constructs refugeehood as a fundamentally
collective, temporary, and exceptional condition; in contrast, urban refugees and their
efforts to achieve legal, economic, and social integration suggest that refugeehood is
more aptly conceptualized as an individual condition that is effectively normalized
through its increasingly protracted nature. Despite the changing nature of refugeehood,
host states in the developing world and dominant, Western states continue to base refugee
policies on the existing refugee master category due to its convergence with their
strategic priorities – exclusion, externalization, and marginalization. Ignoring the growing
trend of urbanization among refugees and their specific protection needs must necessarily
lead to a host of new economic and social problems, the least positive outcome for all
parties. Clearly, an alternative concept of refugeehood which moves beyond the original
master category characteristics and incorporates both contemporary displacement
experiences and evolving refugee needs is overdue.

86

Chapter 6: CONCLUSION
This thesis seeks to address the primary question, “What are the impacts of Agier’s
conception of the refugee master category, translated into camp-centric refugee policy,
on urban refugees?” This thesis set out to answer questions surrounding the experiences
and status of urban refugees with respect to the concepts of the refugee master category,
specifically, how the refugee master category conceptualizes refugeehood, and how this
conceptualization fails to reflect the displacement experiences of a significant portion of
the refugee population. This thesis further addressed the impact of an exclusionary
refugee construct on the development of refugee response policy by examining how
states seek to condition refugee behaviour to conform with the refugee master category,
and how by consequence, states disadvantage those who fail to conform to the refugee
master category. I argue that the international refugee regime bases policy-making on a
refugee master category that is heavily tilted towards characteristics of collectivity,
exceptionality, and temporality, and that these characteristics have become the overriding
perception of refugees in the popular consciousness. These characteristics are advanced
in order to justify policies whose priorities are externalizing, marginalizing, and
excluding refugees rather than addressing the needs of refugees themselves. Above all,
those refugees who do not conform to the characteristics advanced by the refugee master
category and who, by making a different location choice in response to their personal
crisis – namely urban refugees – challenge the priorities of international refugee policy
and face significant structural protection gaps.
I contend that the refugee master category favours camp-settled refugees while
disadvantaging urban refugees. Relying on a camp-centric refugee master category
allows states to justify policies and practices that externalize, marginalize, and exclude
refugees and therefore to a large extent create a class of persons whose existence
becomes one of permanent need rather than rehabilitation. Urban refugees in particular
pose a challenge to the camp-centric master category, illustrating its inability to describe
their displacement experiences. In spite of attempts to act upon their wishes and desires
to integrate somewhere that is safe, being outside the camp exposes them to a myriad of
service and protection gaps which render most of their efforts futile. These protection
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gaps become part of a circle of failure to escape, reinforcing behaviour which conforms
to the camp-centric conceptualization of refugeehood. That is, rather than overcoming
their trauma and rebuilding their lives, refugees remain wary of authority, living on the
fringes of civil society and pursuing, in some cases, desperate measures to survive.
This thesis began by introducing the statistical significance of urban refugees as
well as some of the unique protection and servicing challenges they face. Chapter 1
outlined the conceptual framework through which the concept of refugees generally, and
the disadvantaging of urban refugees in particular, would be addressed. As this author
argues that the challenges facing urban refugees are causally linked to a refugee
construct, or master category, that favours camp-settled refugee response policies – and
camp-settled refugees themselves – over urban settlement, Chapter 1 undertook a review
of literature articulating and describing concepts of refuge and refugeehood.
Chapter 2 sought to define the characteristics of the refugee master category and
illuminate overriding assumptions of who is and who is not a refugee. Drawing from the
works of Michel Agier and B.S. Chimni, this chapter describes how the foundations of
the refugee master category have evolved since the Cold War. Assumptions about
refugeehood prior to and during the Cold War have given way to “new refugees”, whose
characteristics, Chimni notes, are perceived as fundamentally different from Cold War
refugees and who therefore merit different treatment from the international refugee
regime and dominant, Western states. Three key characteristics of the refugee master
category were discussed: the collective nature of displacement and flight; the
exceptionality of seeking refuge; and the temporality of refugeehood. Based on these
three characteristics, it is possible to define the parameters of refugeehood – and in doing
so, to understand that refugees who do not conform to these characteristics, regardless of
their Convention status, are excluded from the protections and benefits of refugeehood.
Chapter 3 investigated the relationship between the refugee master category and
refugee policy, arguing that refugee response policies have increasingly emphasised
camp-based settlement so as to make real and practical the characteristics of refuge, in
turn conforming to the concept of refugeehood. Policies that favour camp-based
settlement, such as camp confinement policies, have come to dominate the international
refugee response regime since the 1990s, despite the fact that significant numbers of
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refugees continue to settle in urban areas. Using the case study of Kenya’s camp
confinement policies, this chapter describes the geo-political context surrounding the
emergence of camp confinement policies, and highlights that the apparent beneficiaries of
camp confinement policies are not refugees themselves but the hosting state and the
international community. This chapter also describes the UNHCR as a major facilitator in
the strategic use of camp confinement policies. Finally, this chapter links camp
confinement policies to the strategic goals of states in their interactions with the
international refugee response regime: to promote a specific concept of refugees – the
refugee master category – in order to justify the externalization and marginalization of
refugees.
Chapter 4 discussed at greater length the purpose and effect of the strategic goals
of externalization, marginalization and exclusion, which can be observed in the refugee
response policies within the international realm, policies largely framed by dominant,
Western states. This chapter touched on some additional differences between the ideal
version of a refugee and those that flee to urban areas. They are different because they do
not necessarily flee in large groups, but instead may be an individual or a single family.
They may be fleeing a series of persecutory actions that cause an irreparable break
between citizen and state, rather than a single cataclysmic event. Consequently, their
flight is not necessarily temporary because they may never be able to return to their
country of origin. In contrast, urban refugees seek to settle in the conceptual and spatial
heartland of host states and economic and social integration in host societies. By actively
pursuing a location where there is a possibility of integration, urban refugees transform
their refugeehood into a permanent and normalized condition, upsetting the strategic
foundations of the refugee master concept.
Chapter 5 drew on case studies of urban refugees residing in Egypt and Lebanon
to illustrate the restrictions host states place on the ability of refugees to achieve
integration. State-imposed restrictions create additional complex legal, economic, and
social service protection gaps for urban refugees, and contribute to an environment of
instability and insecurity which fundamentally reinforce the temporality and
exceptionality of refugeehood. By perpetuating these gaps, host states – with the
complicity of the international community – disadvantage urban refugees to condition
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their behaviour in conformity with the refugee master category, rather than accepting that
the refugee master category is fundamentally flawed and re-evaluating the refugee
concept in light of contemporary displacement experiences generally and the increasing
urbanity of refugeehood in particular.
I have argued that the refugee master category embeds particular characteristics –
namely collectivity, exceptionality, and temporality – into refugee policy discourse,
allowing national governments and international institutions to advance three apparent
strategic priorities – externalization, marginalization, and exclusion. These strategic goals
are pursued even though these defining attributes do not necessarily reflect the
displacement experiences of a significant number of refugees – specifically urban
refugees.
To condition refugee behaviour in conformity with the refugee master category,
states adopt camp-centric response policies which have led to the emergence of a campbiased refugee policy regime. Further, the bias towards camps manifests itself at both the
national and international level. At the national level, camps are in most instances, the
only alternative through which refugees may be officially recognized within another
country’s borders. As described through the Kenyan case study those found in
contravention of camp confinement laws are subject to penalties including forcible
relocation to the camp and, in some cases, refoulement. In addition, the Kenyan
government restricts the ability of UNHCR and other NGOs to offer protection and
assistance outside of camps. In this way, governments deliberately construct camps as the
only legitimate response to refugee influxes, while purposefully limiting the resources
available to urban refugees. These actions run counter in theory, to the rights and
protections offered refugees as articulated in international refugee law, which makes no
distinction regarding where a refugee seeks shelter.
At the international level, both international response agencies and dominant
members of the international community clearly favour camp-based responses. In the
Kenyan case, UNHCR established large camps almost immediately after responsibility
for refugee management was transferred to it by the Kenyan government. Some have
gone so far as to question whether UNHCR should provide assistance to refugees in
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urban settings203. The agency’s recent shift from “care and maintenance” to “selfreliance” suggests that urban refugees will not benefit from the same protection and
assistance as camp-based refugees. The inequitable distribution of response resources is
the major cause of long-standing protection gaps for urban refugees, even in states where
seeking refuge in camps is not an option.
Alice Edwards offers an interesting critique of UNHCR’s 2009 Policy on Refugee
Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas (Urban Refugee Policy), which suggests that,
despite some recognition of the urbanization of refugeehood, a camp-bias is still
prevalent in refugee response policies at the international level. The Urban Refugee
Policy claims as its partial purpose to shift the agency’s working ethos from a focus on
camps to recognizing the legitimacy of urban refugeehood. However, despite recognizing
that UNHCR protection should not be impacted by the location of asylum, the Urban
Refugee Policy is limited to non-legal terminology describing “protection space” rather
than rights-based language with legal foundations. Further, Edwards argues that in its
concluding pages, UNHCR’s Urban Refugee Policy “seems to suggest that one of the
aims of the document is to acknowledge that if camp environments improve, motivations
for leaving them will be reduced and there will be fewer refugees seeking protection in
[urban areas].”204 The Urban Refugee Policy, rather than seeking to truly establish urban
areas as legitimate protection spaces for refugees, plays “into the hands of governments
operating camp confinement policies who argue that UNHCR should spend its time
improving camp conditions rather than engaging with urban refugees.”205
In addition to the direct efforts of the camp-bias to condition refugee behaviour in
conformity with the refugee master category, international refugee policy directs
attention and response resources to refugee camps. In states where seeking refuge in
camp settings is generally not an option, such as Egypt and Lebanon, the national
government rests its case of doing less on the limited resources they are allotted to
support urban refugees, as much as the covert desire to perpetuate the exceptional and
temporary nature of refugeehood. As illustrated by the Egyptian and Lebanese cases,
urban refugees face almost impossibly intractable legal, social and economic protection
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gaps. In the absence of reasonable means to create sustainable livelihoods they remain in
precarious isolation within the heart of the host society, which severely hinders their
ability to build sustainable livelihoods, perpetuating the precariousness of their asylum
and preventing their integration into their host society. States attempt to influence refugee
settlement patterns by implementing a camp-centric refugee policy regime, as illustrated
in Kenya, and by disadvantaging those who do not conform to camp confinement
policies, as discussed in Egypt and Lebanon. If refugee behaviour can be conditioned in
conformity with the refugee master category, both Western and non-Western states can
justify refugee policies that aim to externalize, marginalize, and exclude refugees. In this
way, both the refugee master category and the camp-centric response policy regime built
upon it can be seen as playing key roles in the non-entrée regime that currently
characterises international attitudes toward refugees.
Addressing flaws in the refugee master category and policies built upon it will
require ongoing re-evaluation of popular concepts of refugeehood in light of
contemporary displacement experiences. Numerous scholars have described the changing
nature of conflict and sovereignty. A similar dialogue, with a view to clarifying the
evolution of refugeehood, must be undertaken with respect to the refugee master
category. However, it is essential that such debate rapidly cross over from academia, not
only into the policy-making realm but into the public consciousness. Re-evaluation of the
refugee master category must begin with the recognition that displacement and
refugeehood take on many forms, last for varying durations, and occur in numerous
locations. It must be recognized that different choices of refuge, including seeking
settlement in urban areas, can be legitimate responses to displacement, and that there is
value in supporting these choices. For refugees whose original lifestyle centered in an
urban area, the result is a certain familiarity and opportunity for independence from
national and international aid. For a host state, it is more challenging, but over as little as
the medium term it could mean new loyal entrants into the national population and active
contributors to growth of the national economy. Adopting a human rights-based approach
to interpreting international refugee law and developing refugee response policies may
assist in facilitating such debate. What has become clear through the previous fifty years
of the international refugee regime is that a state-centric approach to displacement and
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refugee management is not conducive to achieving sufficient, substantive refugee
protection.
One of the key issues that must be addressed in re-evaluating the refugee master
category is the contrast between the increasing permanency of displacement – manifested
in the long life of purportedly temporary refugee camps and the preference of many
refugees for resettlement or integration over repatriation – and the persistent assumption
that refugees want to return home as soon as possible. Though initially conceived as a
temporary condition to ensure surrogate protection in the absence of state protection,
refugeehood has evolved to become an almost normalized state of being. It is not unusual
for refugee families displaced for generations to now include members who have never
entered their country of origin. If refugeehood is understood as a potentially permanent
condition, policies that emphasize only externalization, marginalization and exclusion
must be questioned and more effort should be directed to best practices for integrating
refugees into host states as well as to increasing opportunities for other places of
permanent resettlement.
Finally, it must be recognized that re-evaluation and debate cannot occur solely
among host states in the developing world, or among refugee response agencies such as
UNHCR; in order to achieve substantive and lasting change within the international
refugee regime, dominant, Western states must engage in meaningful evaluation of their
involvement in and attitudes toward the international refugee policy regime. As Katja
Luopajarvi writes, “when demanding that states act responsibly internally… and
externally, towards the international community, we must also ask the international
community to act responsibly when stepping in to provide surrogate assistance and
protection.”206 The question that remains is, how can dominant, Western states be
encouraged to engage in such self-reflection, when the contemporary refugee policy
regime aligns so closely with their strategic priorities? Though this question lies at the
root of numerous proposals for reform in the international refugee policy regime,
including burden-sharing and issues linkage, it remains the most difficult to answer.
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Agier argues that, “what on reflection proves genuinely useful [to refugees] is…
to resist by all means possible the establishment on a global scale of a regime of
exceptionalism… that is of interminable delay, as well as other forms of quarantine in
which so many millions of undesirables are confined.”207 To make such resistance
effective will require intensive re-evaluation of the popular conceptualization of
refugeehood. Numerous scholars have articulated structural and conceptual flaws in
international refugee law and policy, but such flaws are rooted so deeply within the
refugee construct that effective solutions cannot be discussed solely at the level of law
and policy. Rather, it is necessary to problematize the refugee master category itself,
evaluating whether its characteristics reflect contemporary displacement experiences or
politically-driven ideas of who should be protected and assisted, and how protection and
assistance is implemented. In light of the growing portions of the refugee population
facing protracted displacement, settling in urban areas and seeking, if not resettlement,
integration into their host community, is it still possible to describe refugeehood as a
large-scale phenomenon that is exceptional and temporary? If refugeehood is no longer
collective, exceptional, and temporary, how can policies that aim to externalize,
marginalize, and exclude be justified? Conceptual questions must be answered before it
will be possible to seek comprehensive, holistic solutions to the flaws in the international
refugee response policy regime that trap urban refugees in limbo, unable to return, unable
to move forward, seeking durability that is always out of reach.
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